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Article 3

The Wages of Human Trafficking
Rana M. Jaleel†
INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama has pledged a “zero tolerance”
approach to human trafficking—a crime that, in his words, “ought
to concern every person, because it is a debasement of our
common humanity[,] . . . every community, because it tears at our
social fabric[,] . . . every business, because it distorts markets[,
and] . . . every nation, because it endangers public health and
fuels violence and organized crime.”1 This stance is hardly
controversial. Pundits and practitioners alike continue to deplore
the occurrence of human trafficking. Yet while President Obama’s
remarks may well reflect a growing national and international
consensus, recent and conflicting reinterpretations of the
elements of human trafficking have destabilized the definition of
the crime and thus its scope and meaning.
The legal definition of human trafficking—which is
remarkably consistent across U.S. federal2 and international
† Assistant Professor, Program in Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies,
University of California, Davis. J.D., Yale Law School, 2004; Ph.D., American Studies,
New York University, 2013. I would like to thank Lisa Duggan, Martha Albertson
Fineman, Katherine Franke, Angela Harris, Claudia Haupt, Clare Huntington, Lance
Liebman, Risa Lieberwitz, Daniel Markovits, Athena Mutua, Robert O’Neil, Ann
Pellegrini, Paul Radvany, Judith Resnick, Carol Rose, Andrew Ross, Carol Sanger, Sarah
Swan, Allison Tait, Donna Young, and the participants of the Columbia Law School
Associates and Fellows Workshop for many generous and illuminating conversations.
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global
Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/09/25/
president-obama-speaks-clinton-global-initiative-annual-meeting#transcript [http://perma.
cc/Q5HT-62W7] (follow “Read the Transcript” hyperlink) [hereinafter Remarks by the
President].
2 Section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines “severe
forms of trafficking in persons” as either “sex trafficking” (“the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex
act,” which was “induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age”) or labor trafficking (“the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services,
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”). The TVPA understands the term
“commercial sex act” to encompass “any sex act on account of which anything of value
is given to or received by any person.” Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub.
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law3—has been subject to wide-ranging interpretations.4 Pared to
its core elements, human trafficking requires (1) an act (the
movement, recruitment, receipt, or harboring of men, women, or
children); (2) a means (by force, fraud, or coercion); and (3) a
purpose (at a minimum, involuntary servitude, slavery, or sexual
or labor exploitation, which may include the removal of organs).
While human trafficking was once viewed as functionally
equivalent to criminalized sexual gender violence,5 recent scholarly
and legal efforts have targeted labor-sector human trafficking,
specifically migrant labor exploitation.6 This nascent focus on labor
exploitation, while a step in the right direction, is nonetheless
insufficient to address the global problem of human trafficking.
Recent changes in how the U.S. State Department interprets the
federal anti-trafficking statute, or the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA),7 prove this point.
L. No. 106-386, div. A, 114 Stat. 1466, 1469-70 (codified as amended in sections of 8, 18,
and 22 U.S.C.), amended by Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875; (codified in sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.),
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119
Stat. 3558 (2006); (codified in sections of 18, 22, and 42 U.S.C.), William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122
Stat. 5044 (codified in sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, and 42 U.S.C.), Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2013 Pub. L. No. 113-14, tit. XII, 127 Stat. 54, 136-60 (Title XII of the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013) [hereinafter TVPA].
3 Article 3, paragraph (a) of the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319, 344
[hereinafter U.N. Trafficking Protocol], instead sets minimums on what will constitute
exploitation. The U.N. Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in persons as
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra, at 344.
4 See Sally Engle Merry, How Big is the Trafficking Problem? The Mysteries
of Quantification, OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/
beyondslavery/sally-engle-merry/how-big-is-trafficking-problem-mysteries-of-quantification
[http://perma.cc/PS3K-N4JF] (discussing how definitions of human trafficking are not
only “vague, overlapping, and even contradictory, but . . . [also] changing over time”).
5 See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture:
Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655,
1657 (2010) (demonstrating that sex-sector trafficking and prostitution dominate
human trafficking policies and debates) [hereinafter Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking].
6 See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of
Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 609, 609-11 (2014) (noting the emergence
of a labor approach to human trafficking) [hereinafter Chuang, Exploitation Creep].
7 Since 2004, the TIP Office has steadily adopted expansive interpretations
of “harboring” and “receipt,” terms listed in the act element of international and

2016]

THE WAGES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

565

In 2012, the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
Office (TIP Office) declared that “many forms of enslavement”8 lie
at the heart of the phenomenon of human trafficking—“[h]uman
[t]rafficking can include but does not require movement.”9 This
eschewal of any movement or recruitment requirement has
resulted in the elimination of any distinction between human
trafficking and forced labor.10 This development, as well as the

domestic anti-trafficking law. These acts alone are sufficient to support a charge of
human trafficking—no movement or recruitment by a third party is required. During
the George W. Bush administration, the distancing of human trafficking from any
movement requirement facilitated President Bush’s position that all prostitution
(whether consensual or not) could constitute a violation of human trafficking law. Now
that the Obama administration has broken with the Bush-era interpretation and set
its sights on non-sex-sector labor trafficking, the absence of the movement requirement
has assumed new significance. The lack of a movement requirement has allowed prior
distinctions between trafficked and nontrafficked forced labor to conceptually crumble.
In this way, the Obama administration may subsume all forced labor within the ambit
of human trafficking. See infra Section III.A; see also Chuang, Exploitation Creep,
supra note 6, at 609-11. Forced labor is defined under international law as “work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” Convention Concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour, opened for signature June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 58
(entered into force May 1, 1932); see also Convention Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, opened for
signature June 17, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13405, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Nov.
19, 2000); Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, opened for signature
June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959); Convention
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, opened for signature June 28, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932).
8 Article 1 of the International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and
Slavery establishes the benchmark definition of slavery: “Slavery is the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.” International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25,
1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 263 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery Convention].
9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 33 (2012). Until 2009,
the TIP Office actively resisted substantive conflation of the concepts of human
trafficking and slavery, naming force, fraud, and coercion—not slavery—as the root of the
crime. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2009) (“The common
denominator of trafficking scenarios is the use of force, fraud, or coercion to exploit a
person for profit.”). By 2014, however, the conflation of human trafficking with slavery
was all but complete. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 29
(2014) (“Human trafficking can include, but does not require, movement. People may be
considered trafficking victims regardless of whether they were born into a state of
servitude, were transported to the exploitative situation, previously consented to work for
a trafficker, or participated in a crime as a direct result of being trafficked. At the heart of
this phenomenon is the traffickers’ goal of exploiting and enslaving their victims and the
myriad coercive and deceptive practices they use to do so.”).
10 See infra Section III.A; see supra note 7 and accompanying text. The U.S.
Department of State linked forced labor to human trafficking in the following manner:
Also known as involuntary servitude, forced labor may result when unscrupulous
employers exploit workers made more vulnerable by high rates of unemployment,
poverty, crime, discrimination, corruption, political conflict, or even cultural
acceptance of the practice. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable, but individuals
also may be forced into labor in their own countries. Female victims of forced or
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simultaneous equation of human trafficking with slavery, has farreaching implications for human trafficking’s meaning. In
essence, these interpretative shifts have pulled the legal
conceptualization of human trafficking in two directions. In the
first, human trafficking is a labor problem, as the elimination of
distinctions between trafficked forced labor and nontrafficked
forced labor suggests. In the second, it is an ownership problem of
a different sort: human trafficking is slavery.
These developments raise extremely pressing questions.
How does the United States enforce a “zero tolerance” approach to
human trafficking if it has no clear, conceptual understanding of
what the act of human trafficking entails? To put a finer point on
it, what is human trafficking “more like”: a labor problem or a
slavery problem? The stakes of these questions become readily
apparent when we recognize the revocation of the movement
requirement and the equation of human trafficking with slavery
as indicative of an early, emerging split between U.S. and
international perspectives on human trafficking. While the
United States has characterized human trafficking as a problem
of slavery, the international community has largely sought to
preserve distinctions between the variety of acts encompassed by
anti-trafficking instruments, including distinctions between
slavery, forced labor, and an array of lesser labor exploitations.11
The urgency of the problem of human trafficking, together
with its doctrinal complexity, demands a principled exploration of
its limits. This article takes up the challenge by asking a seemingly
straightforward question: What is the wrong of human trafficking?
In the 14 years since the advent of contemporary human
trafficking laws, this question has yet to be addressed by legal
scholars. Now it is time to ask the question anew. For while we
may intuitively believe that we will “know it when we see it,” the
continuously transfiguring terrain of human trafficking law has
only offered disparate examples of what human trafficking might
be with no underlying theoretical account of why all acts
bonded labor, especially women and girls in domestic servitude, are often sexually
exploited as well.
What is Modern Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/index.htm
[http://perma.cc/8QUC-FA68] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
11 See infra Part IV; see also Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at
619-20 (describing how the TIP Office has used forced-labor creep to justify expanding
its “bureaucratic turf” to cover practices traditionally considered by the International
Labor Organization (ILO) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s International Labor
Affairs Bureau to be nontrafficked forced labor (i.e., forced labor not preceded by a
process of movement or recruitment) and also how “slavery creep” has been used to
justify the international expansion of U.S. criminal authority).
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prohibited by extant law are in fact actionable. While there are no
fast and easy rules or tests to identify human trafficking, settling
a conceptual approach helps ensure a more targeted, steady, and
uniform forward course of action by establishing what we
understand human trafficking to be, why we act against it, how we
might prevent it, and in turn, what it means to be a free person.
Accounting for the wrong of human trafficking is therefore no
theoretical indulgence, but an operational imperative.
Accordingly, this article does not analyze human
trafficking from within the familiar frames of transnational
crime, sexualized gender violence, or human rights. Nor does it
consider human trafficking to be best described as a problem of
slavery or a problem faced largely by migrant workers. Each of
these approaches fails to capture the core wrong of human
trafficking. Instead, this article views human trafficking as a labor
and employment problem that fits under what I call the new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm. In this account, human
trafficking is wrong because it exploits worker vulnerability,
regardless of migrant status, by forcing, coercing, or deceiving
people into performing work (including commercial sex acts)
under intolerable, illicit, or degrading conditions.12 Therefore,
human trafficking law should not be understood solely as a
corrective to state failure to manage migrant workers, but rather
as a lens through which to see the connections between human
trafficking and domestic low-wage labor markets.
In advocating for a low-wage/vulnerable labor approach to
human trafficking, this article argues that U.S. attempts to cast
human trafficking as in essence a crime of enslavement are both
descriptively and normatively incorrect. Casting all forms of
human trafficking as slavery does not reflect the actual conditions
and contexts from which prosecutable charges of human trafficking
may arise. Further, the charged rhetoric of slavery can obscure how
dire the conditions of erstwhile “freely chosen” work can be, thus
reinforcing an inaccurate and perilous normative divide that casts
all that falls beyond the rubric of slavery as “free.” The question
that scholars and practitioners of human trafficking law should
be asking at this time is not “what does it mean to be a slave in
the twenty-first century?” but rather “what does it mean to be a
worker in the twenty-first century global economy?”
12 The term “vulnerable labor” denotes a methodological commitment to
Martha Albertson Fineman’s vulnerability theory, which emphasizes the structural
and institutional arrangements that the state has or will create to manage human
vulnerability. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
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Additionally, this article contends that the emerging labor
approach, which uses migrant labor as a template for
understanding human trafficking, is also descriptively and
normatively incorrect. Current human trafficking debates that
offer the separate but overlapping paradigms of slavery and labor
migration as palliatives to dominant criminal gender violence
approaches are conceptually conflicted. They are caught between
construing the wrong of human trafficking as a violation of
equality (with a slavery paradigm positing a discriminatory
dimension to a problem of individual ownership) or as a violation
of labor rights (understood in the classic sense as collective rights
that govern structural relationships between employers and
employees and not solely as the provisioning of equal treatment
for exploited migrant laborers).
Neither approach accounts for the full range of acts
proscribed by the widely adopted U.N. Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (U.N. Trafficking Protocol)13 and the TVPA.14
Simply put, the legal definition of human trafficking encompasses
more than acts of slavery, be it sexual or otherwise, and applies to
both migrant and nonmigrant workers. Less severe exploitation,
including the accumulation of poor labor conditions that
individually would not constitute actionable exploitation, have
also been interpreted as prohibited under the legal definition of
human trafficking—and largely overlooked.15 This discretionary
oversight means that many migrant and nonmigrant low wage
and vulnerable workers whose working conditions might
warrant a charge of human trafficking fail to receive legal
analysis or attention.
Theorizing and foregrounding the wrong of human
trafficking through the new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm
captures the full range of offenses proscribed by human
trafficking law, from slavery to forced labor and other lesser

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15 See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, THE COST OF COERCION: GLOBAL REPORT UNDER
THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
AT WORK 5-9, 13 (2009) [hereinafter ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009] (describing the Delphi
indicators of human trafficking, which do not depend upon physical force or coercion);
see also INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN
BEINGS: RESULTS FROM A DELPHI SURVEY IMPLEMENTED BY THE ILO AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009) [hereinafter ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT]
(listing operational indicators for human trafficking and detailing how they were
established via the Delphi method); see infra Section IV.C.
13
14
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exploitations.16 All the while, the new paradigm understands the
wrong that binds these offenses to be a collective wrong that
inheres in the inner workings of global labor markets, manifests
in specific employment conditions, and affects migrant and
nonmigrant workers alike. Further, the new paradigm identifies
how the existing labor paradigm—which focuses almost
exclusively on the specific vulnerabilities of migrant labor—has
limited analytically the would-be structural scope of a labor
analysis by construing the wrong of human trafficking as
functionally an equality or autonomy wrong. That view, what I
call the labor migration paradigm, focuses on affording migrant
workers the same protections as nonmigrant workers in order to
end exploitative working conditions. Recent empirical research,
however, has thrown the general conditions of the U.S. low-wage
labor market—and the efficacy of existing labor and employment
protections—into question.17 Given this context, this article
suggests that a low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm best
describes the wrong of human trafficking while avoiding the
pitfalls of narrow analyses of equality.
While a labor migration paradigm helpfully emphasizes
how cumulative labor conditions, characterized by subtly
coercive and deceptive employment practices, can also cross the
threshold into human trafficking,18 it cabins the full import of
that claim. It does so by limiting its analysis to migrant workers
and specific types of work, often identifying “sectors prone to
human trafficking”—from agriculture, home health care, service,
begging, domestic work, and manufacturing, to name a few19—as
the target of legal and social interventions.20 In contrast, the new
16 See Jonathan Todres, Human Rights, Labor, and the Prevention of Human
Trafficking: A Response to A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 142, 145-46 (2013) (arguing that labor-based and human rights-based responses
are not mutually exclusive). Crucially, understanding the wrong of human trafficking as a
low wage/vulnerable labor wrong does not automatically put it at odds with human rights or
even criminal law frameworks, although a classic understanding of labor rights can mitigate
against the excessive individualism of these two approaches. Id. at 152-53. And in New
York, for example, violations of state labor laws are increasingly met with criminal
prosecution. See Juan Gonzalez, State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman Says Those Who
Knowingly Violate State Labor Laws Will Face Criminal Charges and Possible Jail Time,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 13, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/stateattorney-general-eric-schneiderman-knowingly-violate-state-labor-laws-face-criminalcharges-jail-time-article-1.1113537 [http://perma.cc/XLT7-Y7A5].
17 See infra Section IV.D.
18 See ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 13; ILO OPERATIONAL
INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15; see also Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for
Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 86-87 (2012).
19 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 73-74 (2009).
20 Id.
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paradigm’s more general emphasis on the conditions of low-wage
and vulnerable work prevents a too-narrow focus on job sectors
or categories whose susceptibility to human trafficking may
change over time.21 Additionally, the new low-wage/vulnerable
labor paradigm frames the problem of labor as one that
explicitly traverses the categories of migrant and nonmigrant
workers. In doing so, it eliminates the current framework’s
latent equality argument, which splinters the full potential of a
labor analysis by viewing migrant labor as the template for
understanding human trafficking.
In this way, the new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm
prevents us from ignoring how contemporary conditions of lowwage work—including unenforced or underenforced employment
law—not only enable human trafficking, but continue to exploit
those who survive their trafficking only to enter what can be an
equally exploitative low-wage labor market. Therefore, the new
low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm does not foreground
movement/recruitment as the heart of the offense and cautions
against axiomatic separations between, for example, trafficked
and nontrafficked forced labor. That hard distinction rests on the
fallacy that nontrafficked forced laborers inevitably have more
control or agency than nontrafficked workers—an assumption
that empirical research and on-the-ground observation have since
undermined.22 Anchoring the wrong of human trafficking in a lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm thus mitigates the too-narrow
focus on migrant labor while also correcting for the overwhelming
emphasis on sex-sector human trafficking that still dominates
legal efforts to quell the crime.23
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm would,
however, not understand all instances of human trafficking as
crimes of enslavement. The wrong of human trafficking exists less
in its proximate relationship to slavery than it does in the systemic
problems that inhere in low-wage labor. Perhaps most importantly,
understanding the wrong of human trafficking as a low21 See infra Section IV.A; ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS,
UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S
CITIES 56 (2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XLT7-Y7A5] (defining low-wage industries as those whose “median wage
for front-line workers was less than 85 percent of the city’s median wage”).
22 See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
23 Despite an increased interest in labor, prosecutions worldwide remain
fixated on sex-sector human trafficking. The U.S. Department of State’s 2014
Trafficking in Persons Report estimates that in 2013, the 44,758 trafficked persons
identified worldwide resulted in only 9,460 prosecutions and 5,776 convictions. Only
470 of these convictions were related to labor trafficking, while the rest were related to
sex trafficking. 2014 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 9, at 45.
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wage/vulnerable labor one will ward off the conceptual collapse of
human trafficking and slavery by fostering principled discussion of
where we now want to draw the line between exploitation of all
stripes and what constitutes the impermissible ownership of
persons as a jus cogen norm and crime of universal jurisdiction.24
Finally, in advocating for a low-wage/vulnerable labor
approach to human trafficking, this article does not mean to
suggest that all low-wage labor abuses should be found to
constitute human trafficking or that human trafficking law
alone should be responsible for remedying widespread domestic
workplace violations. Rather, this article seeks to establish a
conceptual framework for human trafficking that identifies the
problems of domestic low-wage labor that are at human
trafficking’s very core. Acknowledging the overlap between
human trafficking and domestic low-wage labor violations is not
only necessary for a clear conceptual understanding of the wrong
of human trafficking, it is also doctrinally supported by the
expansive definition and remedies offered by our anti-trafficking
federal statute, the TVPA, and international law.
Since its 2003 reauthorization, the TVPA provides not
only criminal avenues of redress, but also an underutilized
private right of action for persons whose exploitation constitutes
human trafficking.25 This private right of action was intended to
provide more comprehensive relief to trafficked persons than that
offered by civil suits brought solely under the Fair Labor
Standards Act,26 analogous state employment laws, and state

24 See 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 8. Often thought to involve the
destruction of a person’s juridical personality—the turning of a person with innate and
assigned rights into a “thing”—slavery is an international crime and a peremptory or
jus cogen norm. See Paul Finkleman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or
Property?, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 105-34 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
Jus cogen, or “compelling law,” norms outrank all other norms and principles.

International crimes that rise to the level of jus cogens constitute obligatio
erga omnes which are inderogable. Legal obligations which arise from the
higher status of such crimes include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the
non-applicability of statutes of limitations for such crimes, the nonapplicability of any immunities up to and including Heads of State, the nonapplicability of the defense of “obedience to superior orders” . . . , the
universal application of these obligations whether in time of peace or war,
their non-derogation under “states of emergency,” and universal jurisdiction
over the perpetrators of such crimes.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63 (1996).
25 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat. 2875, 2878.
26 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).

572

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

common law torts.27 Encouraging TVPA-based civil litigation of
the lesser labor exploitation claims of migrant and nonmigrant
workers is one way to put the new low-wage/vulnerable labor
paradigm into practice and enable courts to establish the proper
boundary between labor exploitation that amounts to human
trafficking and other civil or regulatory labor exploitation.
Accordingly, this article proceeds in five parts. Part I
provides an overview of contemporary human trafficking law,
including the civil and criminal rights of action offered by the
TVPA. It then analyzes the dominant legal paradigms used to
interpret human trafficking—the transnational criminal law,
human rights, and gender justice paradigms. Each of the current
paradigms fails in its own way to adequately explain or capture
the full range of acts prohibited by human trafficking law.
Crucially, each also diverts attention from the core problem of
human trafficking—low-wage and vulnerable labor.
Part II examines the emerging labor paradigm, which
assumes its primary target to be migrant labor. Part III considers
how a conceptual fusion between criminal acts of forced
movement and economically motivated migration has fueled the
vision of migrants as the paradigmatic subjects of human
trafficking law.
Part IV critiques the labor migration paradigm by assessing
the strengths and limitations of the new low-wage/vulnerable labor
27 The U.N. Trafficking Protocol, the TVPA, and other anti-trafficking legal
instruments provide remedies for trafficked persons beyond those offered by
employment law. These include, for example, the TVPA’s “T-visa,” which enables some
trafficked persons to remain in the country. See TVPA, Sec. 107(e), supra note 2. The
TVPA also allows trafficked persons to recover payment of wages that exceed the
federal minimum wage, an option that the FLSA does not provide. Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. 1466, 1488
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2012)). Additionally, the FLSA does not apply to all
workers. Most relevant to this discussion, perhaps, the FLSA also does not cover forced
prostitution. For these reasons, a human trafficking legal framework can address
exploitation without the categorical restrictions imposed by domestic labor law, bridge
migrant and nonmigrant worker exploitation, and provoke a broader discussion about
labor, immigration, and general low-wage and vulnerable labor exploitation in the
United States and around the world. For a more detailed discussion of civil remedies
and the TVPA, see Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private
Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24-25 (2004) (assessing the benefits of civil litigation for trafficked
persons as an alternative and in addition to criminal prosecution), Theodore R.
Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person
Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 431, 437-38
(2011) (explaining why civil remedies under the TVPA have largely been unexplored by
persons who have endured sex-sector human trafficking), and Jennifer S. Nam, The
Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of Action for Human Trafficking,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2007) (analyzing TVPA civil suits and reasons for their low
numbers). Notably, these authors also retain a focus on migrant labor.
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paradigm for human trafficking. To do so, this part juxtaposes the
labor migration paradigm with recent sociological, empirical work
on low-wage labor in the United States, which reveals widespread
and systematic violations of the most basic workplace
protections—the sort assumed to have been long addressed by
domestic labor law. From this perspective, it becomes clear that
the labor migration paradigm is conceptually tethered to specific
ideas about who is most vulnerable to exploitation—ideas that are
neither descriptively nor normatively correct.
Part V then returns to the issue of slavery. Here, the
article analyzes how a new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm
for human trafficking might interface with ongoing debates about
which vision of slavery should be controlling: de facto or de jure.
This discussion helps illuminate what is at stake, in part, in
naming the wrong of human trafficking and crafting a legal
distinction between exploitation and impermissible ownership:
the conversion of people into property. Understanding the wrong
of human trafficking as a low-wage/vulnerable labor one best fits
anti-trafficking law’s broad scope while still preserving the
integrity of related legal concepts. In short, human trafficking
law, in doctrine and practice, must be understood within the
context of historical and contemporary conceptions of labor and
situated within the annals of the laws of work.
I.

THE PARAMETERS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAW

Contemporary human trafficking laws were adopted a
scant 15 years ago but have since taken a firm hold of the legal
imagination. While human trafficking has become a global subject
du jour, fault lines have emerged in the primary anti-trafficking
legal instruments, namely the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the
TVPA. Intentionally broad language and vaguely defined
enumerated elements have opened the door to conflicting legal
approaches to human trafficking.
Iterations of three conceptual approaches to interpreting
human trafficking law currently dominate law and policy
discussions. They are the transnational criminal law paradigm, the
human rights paradigm, and the gender violence paradigm. Each
has particular strengths and limitations in its characterization of
the wrong of human trafficking. On balance, the shifting
conceptualizations of human trafficking occur in response to the
early dominance of a transnational criminal approach to human
trafficking—one notable for an almost singular focus on the sexual
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exploitation of women and children.28 This approach, championed
by the George W. Bush administration, conflated voluntary and
involuntary prostitution and other commercial sex acts, leading to
the neglect of actionable instances of other forms of labor
exploitation while obscuring the exploitation of men and LGBTQ
persons.29
A.

The Elements of Human Trafficking

Contemporary human trafficking law began at the turn of
the millennium with the passage of two legal instruments: the
U.N. Trafficking Protocol30 and the TVPA.31 The U.N. Trafficking
Protocol has with notable consistency served as the template for
subsequent human trafficking law. Since its enactment, this law
has mushroomed into an international legal system comprised of
“regional treaties, abundant interpretive guidance, a range of
policy instruments, and a canon of state practice.”32 According to
the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime’s 2014 Global Report
on Trafficking in Persons, the U.N. Human Trafficking Protocol
has been ratified by 162 countries and is nothing short of a
“success story.”33
The U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA introduced
new definitions of human trafficking that, by virtue of their
capaciousness and calculated association with transnational
organized crime, ushered the issue to international prominence.34
The TVPA and the U.N. Trafficking Protocol each provide a
tripartite definition of human trafficking. The crime requires an
act (the movement, recruitment, receipt, or harboring of men,
women, or children) accomplished by a means (by force, fraud, or
coercion) for a purpose (at a minimum, involuntary servitude,

Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1657.
See id.
30 See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3.
31 See TVPA, supra note 2. See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3.
32 See Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Quagmire
or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 791 (2009).
33 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 15 (2014).
34 The 1998 and 1999 intergovernmental meetings that resulted in the U.N.
Human Trafficking Protocol were by all accounts rushed; their primary purpose was to
achieve an international cooperation agreement on its parent convention, the U.N.
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. See Gallagher, supra note 32, at
789-93. That human trafficking was placed under the auspices of the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime and not kept in its historical home within the U.N. human rights
system was itself quite controversial. For a full description of the process, see id.
28
29
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slavery, or sexual or labor exploitation, which may include the
removal of organs).35
From the start, the definition of human trafficking has
hardly been exact. For the sake of consensus among states, the
elements of the emerging crime of human trafficking were left
intentionally vague. The elements of the means component (force,
fraud, and coercion) are also not explicitly defined in international
law. Further, under the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA,
the question of what degree of coercion or abuse of power satisfies
this definitional prong remains an open one.36 These instruments
also codify a distinction between sexual exploitation and labor
exploitation—a framework that has contributed to the gendered,
hypersexual focus of much human trafficking law, policy, and
discourse.37 Moreover, the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the
TVPA each neglect to define the new legal term “exploitation” in a
targeted way, fostering uncertainty as to the conditions under
which exploitation amounts to human trafficking.38 It is also
important to note that exploitation is enumerated not as a
separate offense, but as an element of the crime of human
trafficking.39
See TVPA, supra note 2, at § 103; U.N. Trafficking Protocol, art. 3, supra note 3.
See Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409,
409, 414 (2011) (noting how “the laws addressing human trafficking continue to struggle
with delineating the dimensions of coercion” and calling for a theory of “‘situational
coercion,’ . . . [which] recognizes that instead of experiencing coercion through direct threats
of harm from their traffickers, many trafficked workers comply with abusive working
conditions due to circumstances that render them vulnerable to the exploitation”).
37 No reputable research has ever demonstrated that women are more vulnerable
to human trafficking than men, yet women’s sexual exploitation is the most commonly
identified form of human trafficking. As a result, it appears that “a disproportionate number
of trafficking victims are women.” See Michael T. Tien, Human Trafficking: The Missing
Male Victim, 18 PUB. INT. L. REP. 207, 208 (2013) (arguing that the 2013 reauthorization of
the TVPA, which was added as an amendment to the Violence Against Women Act’s
reauthorization, “ignores the prominence of male victims of human trafficking in the U.S.
and abroad”); see also LAURA MARÍA AGUSTÍN, SEX AT THE MARGINS: MIGRATION, LABOUR
MARKETS, AND THE RESCUE INDUSTRY 39 (2007) (observing that in human trafficking
discourse, “men are routinely expected to encounter and overcome trouble, but women may
be irreparably damaged by it”); Mike Dottridge, Introduction, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE
IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 17
(Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women ed., 2007) (arguing that human trafficking is
perceived as a gendered issue and that “countries overlook the possibility that men can be
trafficked”); Grace Chang & Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human
Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 317, 320-21 (2007) (arguing that enforcement agencies’ focus on sex trafficking
neglects the larger trafficking phenomenon).
38 See ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that “for the
legal concept of exploitation, which underpins the definition of trafficking in the
Palermo Protocol, there is almost no precedent in international law, nor is there much
national legislation”).
39 See infra Section III.A.
35
36
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As a result, both the U.N. Human Trafficking Protocol and
the TVPA as written are amenable to vast interpretative shifts.
Anne T. Gallagher, who participated in drafting the U.N.
Trafficking Protocol, has lauded the broad definitional scope of
human trafficking as the U.N. Trafficking Protocol’s main
achievement.40 Gallagher has also praised the U.N. Trafficking
Protocol’s gender-neutral language and inclusion of not only sexsector human trafficking, but also other kinds of labor-market
exploitation.41 The strength of such an expansive definition of
exploitation, however, is also its downside, in that it requires a
continual recalibration of its focus and scope. These adjustments,
which implicate the legal recognition of human trafficking, also
affect the implementation of human trafficking law. Given, for
example, the specific enforcement mechanisms authorized by the
TVPA, identifying what constitutes human trafficking and in turn
what actions the TVPA requires in response to it have significant
geopolitical implications.
While the TVPA and the U.N. Trafficking Protocol are
compatible by letter of the law, the United States’ influence and
ability to set the legal and policy terms of the global antitrafficking debate are difficult to overstate.42 The TVPA is
infamous for the reach of its unilateral global sanctions regime.43
The TVPA’s congressional sponsors believed that the eradication
of human trafficking in the United States depended upon other
countries’ behavior—namely their explicit cooperation with U.S.
anti-trafficking efforts. The resulting unilateral sanctions regime
empowers the U.S. government to deny nonhumanitarian,
nontrade-related foreign assistance to any government perceived
as noncompliant with U.S.-defined anti-trafficking “minimum
standards.”44 In applying these minimum standards, the U.S.
State Department considers and classifies countries as either
origin, transit, or destination countries and issues an annual
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) that details the state
of human trafficking in countries across the world. Notably, the
United States did not begin assessing its own human trafficking
issues and including them in the TIP Report until 2012.45
Gallagher, supra note 32, at 791.
Id.
42 See Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 438-39 (2006).
43 Id.
44 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A,
§ 108, 114 Stat. 1466, 1480-81 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (2012)).
45 See Remarks by the President, supra note 1.
40
41
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It is against this backdrop that efforts to move human
trafficking beyond the criminal prostitution reform debates that
characterized its infancy46 occur—a backdrop where countries’
prior classifications as origin, transit, or destination countries
linger even as new, expansive, non-sex-sector labor-inclusive
interpretations of human trafficking are deployed, and even as
the operational parameters of what constitutes human trafficking
shift. This conceptual, legal, and geopolitical landscape has
complicated the recognition of lesser labor offenses that might
constitute human trafficking while keeping legal efforts too
tightly focused on migrant labor. These shortfalls have occurred
due to shifting paradigms that have, in turn, contributed to a
shifting conception of the wrong of human trafficking.
B.

The Dominant Paradigms of Human Trafficking

Contemporary human trafficking law rests at the
intersection of three dominant paradigms: transnational criminal
law, gender violence, and human rights. In practice, this
conflation is nearly impossible to pry apart, so steeped is the
language of criminal justice in the wrenching image of the
stereotypical trafficked person: a woman, stripped of all rights,
spirited to a strange locale, and forced into “sexual slavery.”
Subsequent sections of this article will further explain how, given
the current doctrine, adopting a low-wage labor paradigm best
addresses the challenges of human trafficking, including sexsector human trafficking. First, however, close and comparative
attention to how various legal paradigms conceive of the wrong of
human trafficking—what they reveal and what they obscure—
can help illuminate the underlying visions of human freedom that
motivate and animate human trafficking law. These conceptions
of freedom have produced inadequate legal outcomes by failing to
address and describe the range of actions prohibited by antitrafficking instruments. To ground the analysis of the wrong of
human trafficking, this article asks: What kind of wrong is
envisaged by the paradigms offered to explain it, who is at risk of
suffering from it, and how does this notion of the wrong interact
and intersect with other innovations in human trafficking law to
construct the definition of freedom?

46

See infra Section I.B.2, Part II.
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1. Human Trafficking as a Transnational Crime
A criminal and law enforcement approach dominates
current human trafficking law and policy.47 This criminal law
paradigm deems the wrong of human trafficking a public one,
wrought primarily by individual wrongdoers.48 The U.N. Human
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA each conceive of human
trafficking as a critical state security issue deeply tied to
transnational organized crime syndicates that facilitate
clandestine and often illicit migration that targets primarily
women and children.49 As such, efforts to stem or eliminate its
occurrence exceed the sovereign prerogatives of immigration and
border control that typically occupy a single state. Instead, as a
transnational crime, human trafficking is construed as a global
problem best approached by all states acting in concert. In other
words, as a transnational crime, human trafficking is not merely
an affront to sovereign state interests. It is an affront to justice
and humanity that every state has a duty to criminalize.
The transnationality of the crime of human trafficking
therefore dictates powerful and extensive state intervention.
Because networks of bad individuals commit the crime, the
state is empowered to flush them out from wherever they
might be, including ostensibly private spheres. By this logic,
almost all efforts to combat human trafficking in an individual
47 See
ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
TRAFFICKING 68 (2010) (arguing that “the 1990s marked an important shift in the
international legal framework around trafficking” away from human rights approaches
and toward a transnational organized crime model); Micah N. Bump, Treat the
Children Well: Shortcomings in the United States’ Effort to Protect Child Trafficking
Victims, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 73, 73 (2009) (“[T]he U.S.
Government is taking a law enforcement approach and not a victim-centered approach
to combating trafficking.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-offs: Protecting
Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609,
1616 (2010); Dottridge, supra note 37, at 1 (“[T]he priority for governments around the
world in their efforts to stop human trafficking has been to arrest, prosecute and
punish traffickers, rather than to protect the human rights of people who have been
trafficked.”); Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel:
Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 345-52 (2007); Jayne Huckerby,
United States of America (USA), in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTITRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 230, 247 (Global
Alliance Against Traffic in Women ed., 2007) (explaining how the U.S. government’s
“prosecutorial focus often runs counter to the rights of trafficked persons”); Jonathan
Todres, Widening Our Lens: Incorporating Essential Perspectives in the Fight Against
Human Trafficking, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 53, 57-67 (2011).
48 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823)
(describing the theory of utilitarianism and the tension between criminal punishment
and individual freedom).
49 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A,
§ 102, 114 Stat. 1466, 1466; U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 343.
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state’s domestic or civil sphere are justified, including the
surveillance of private financial data by search engines alert to
suspicious expenditures,50 enhanced border control,51 and
armed raids of residences rumored to be housing commercial
sexual activity.52
While the wisdom of encouraging states to engage in
what Jonathan Simon calls “governing through crime”53 is
debatable, the stamp of transnational criminality and its
expressive function is a weighty one that demands intensive
mobilization of state resources, as well as moral condemnation.54
From the sheer breadth of state participation, the enduring
visibility of the issue, and its emphasis on the global nature of
the problem, the transnational criminal law paradigm has
50 See John Reed, Palantir Now Fighting Human Traffickers, Instead of the
U.S. Army, FOREIGN POLICY: THE COMPLEX (June 19, 2013, 10:24 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/19/palantir-now-fighting-human-traffickers-instead-ofthe-u-s-army/ [http://perma.cc/2NPN-BSLE].
51 Article 11 of the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the Protocol Against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, each require the strengthening of
border controls and enhanced cooperation between border control agencies. See U.N.
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 348; Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 480, 512-13 [hereinafter Migrants
Smuggling Protocol]. Additionally, Article 12 of those Protocols mandates that states
ensure the integrity and security of their travel documents, while Article 13 of both
Protocols requires state parties to verify at the request of another state party the
legitimacy and validity of any travel documents purportedly released by them. See U.N.
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 348; Migrants Smuggling Protocol, supra, at 513.
52 See Melissa Ditmore & Juhu Thukral, Accountability and the Use of Raids
to Fight Trafficking, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV. 134, 134 (2012) (arguing that “[d]ata from
the United States suggests that raids conducted by local law enforcement agencies are
an ineffective means of locating and identifying trafficked persons”).
53 For Jonathan Simon, “governing through crime” describes a remarkable
and pronounced shift in the organization of late twentieth-century civil society, which
he distills to three key corollaries: (1) the rise of crime as a crucial strategic issue, (2)
the ability of the “fight against crime” to legitimate actions that have other
motivations, and (3) the seepage of crime and criminal justice metaphors into other
social institutions, including schools. Simon uses this phrase to describe how, since the
1990s, the United States has “built a new civic and political order structured around
the problem of violent crime.” In Simon’s account, these attempts to govern through
crime have been profoundly undemocratic. Whether democracy is valued for its liberty
or equality-enhancing features, he argues, governing through crime has exacerbated
U.S. class and race-based social striations, as “the vast reorienting of fiscal and
administrative resources toward the criminal justice system at both the federal and
state level, has resulted in a shift aptly described as a transformation from a ‘welfare
state’ to a ‘penal state.’” The role of the state has shifted from providing for its populace
to policing it. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3-6 (2007).
54 Criminal
law’s expressive function is significant. The transnational
criminalization of human trafficking expresses an international consensus that such
exploitation is beyond the pale. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 822 (1994) (describing how law affects social valuation).
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certainly enjoyed some success, and it has undoubtedly
safeguarded the rights and lives of many who would otherwise
have suffered without recognition or redress.
The harms that the transnational criminal law paradigm
obscures, however, are equally consequential.55 First, by framing
the wrong of human trafficking as a public offense committed by
outlying wrongdoers, the criminal law paradigm ignores the
structural conditions that facilitate human trafficking and diverts
attention away from them. Such structural conditions include the
inner workings of global markets,56 the interplay between
immigration law and securitized border control,57 weak or
underenforced labor laws,58 the broader private law backdrops
against which human trafficking and other relevant law
operates,59 and the state’s role and interests in maintaining these
orders.60 The transnational criminal law paradigm’s problems,
then, lie in its focus on the individual wrongdoer and not the
economic motivations of migration. In this way, the criminal law
paradigm fails to appropriately consider the labor dimensions of
human trafficking and casts trafficked persons as hapless victims
forced into extreme, violent conditions, instead of agents who
have made choices, however limited, that have led to exploitative
outcomes.61 A human rights approach has sought to address the
shortcomings of the transnational criminal law paradigm with
some success and some limitations. In the next section, I analyze
this human rights perspective before returning to a particularly
entrenched criminal perspective that demands more concerted
attention: the equation of human trafficking with sex-sector
human trafficking, which locates the wrong of human trafficking
in gender violence.

55 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Shamir, supra note 18,
at 79 (“Yet despite this worldwide mobilization against human trafficking, the
academic literature on anti-trafficking efforts has been largely critical of the emerging
[criminal] legal paradigm.”).
56 See, e.g., Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to
Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 550 (2009).
57 See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human
Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5-6 (2008).
58 See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 18, at 105-06.
59 See, e.g., TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, SEX TRAFFICKING: A PRIVATE LAW RESPONSE
1 (2013) (discussing the rarity of private law claims against traffickers).
60 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 57, at 5 (arguing that human trafficking
laws, as presently configured, are “often convenient for (if not essential to) the project of
globalized investment and trade”); Haynes, supra note 47, at 350 (arguing that practical,
political, and theoretical concerns hinder U.S. efforts to protect trafficked persons).
61 See Haynes, supra note 47, at 373.
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2. Human Trafficking as a Human Rights Issue
In the wake of human trafficking’s criminalization, human
rights advocates have struggled to infuse a human rights
perspective into the dominant transnational criminal law
paradigm.62 Instead of targeting perpetrators for punishment,
human rights advocates seek a “victim friendly” global legal
regime—one focused on and responsive to the needs and rights of
trafficked persons themselves. In the words of legal scholar
Allegra McLeod, “[a] human rights approach would emphasize
prevention and care for those at risk of, or victim to, trafficking; it
would not rely primarily on criminal law paradigms of innocent,
‘iconic’ victims, and individual, culpable trafficker defendants.”63
Human trafficking victims would, for instance, be understood to
possess an untrammeled right to assistance—not one conditioned
on their willingness or ability to cooperate with law enforcement in
the prosecution of their traffickers.64 Forced repatriation would also
be prohibited. McLeod’s argument illustrates the aspirational pull
of human rights, where appeals in its name place the “human”—
undifferentiated, equal to all others—at the analytic center of the
legal problem.
If the aspirations of human rights law are laudable, critics
argue that a human rights paradigm can nonetheless obscure the
wrong of human trafficking.65 Like the transnational criminal
62 The early and vast gulf between the criminalization of human rights
perspectives is practically a truism. Human rights provisions in the U.N. Trafficking
Protocol do not mirror the language of obligation found in the criminalization provisions.
Instead, states are only required—in “appropriate cases” and “to the extent possible
under its domestic law”—to “consider” and “endeavor to undertake” assistance and
protection for trafficked persons. See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 345-47.
63 Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 83, 112 (2010). In fact, only one human rights obligation, the duty to furnish those
subjected to human trafficking with access to a system to seek compensation, is
mandatory. “Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal system contains
measures that offer victims of trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining
compensation for damages suffered.” U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 345.
64 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(l)(E)(i)(I) (2012) (requiring that prior to receiving
assistance, the trafficked person “is willing to assist in every reasonable way in the
investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons or is unable to
cooperate with such a request due to physical or psychological trauma”); see also
Haynes, supra note 47, at 345 (“The United States approaches its efforts to combat
trafficking in human beings from a law enforcement perspective, with the justification
for victim assistance emerging from the willingness and ability of victims to cooperate
with law enforcement.”); Todres, supra note 16, at 150 (“In fact, the TVPA does not
ensure victims’ rights to assistance but rather conditions assistance to certain victims
on their willingness to cooperate with law enforcement in the prosecution of their
traffickers. That is hardly a rights-based approach.” (citation omitted)).
65 See Shamir, supra note 18, at 80 (contending that “[f]ar from being
marginalized, a human rights approach to trafficking constitutes an important element
of the current global anti-trafficking campaign and has actually become part of the
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perspective that it seeks to correct, human rights approaches
foreground individual harm and wrongdoing at the expense of
broader analysis of the global market interactions that spawn
human trafficking.66 As a result, human rights paradigms tend to
provide a way of understanding human trafficking that may
check the power of individual states or groups of states (targeting,
for instance, the poor treatment of commercial sex workers by
their traffickers), but may fail to reign in other arrangements of
multistate or corporate power (as when human rights violations
are marshaled in the service of ulterior economic interests or used
to mask or justify outright land grabs and predatory wars).67
What such criticism also illustrates is the potential for
human rights and transnational criminal law/security approaches
to converge—especially, as the next section details, in the name of
gender justice.
3. Human Trafficking as Gender Violence
U.S. federal and state prosecutors have reported that
definitional—and actively evolving—ambiguities in legal
interpretations of human trafficking have fostered tremendous
degrees of discretionary differentiation between acts that could,
for example, easily be classified as either human trafficking or
routine prostitution.68 If sex-sector human trafficking has suffered
problem”); Hathaway, supra note 57, at 26 (arguing that “the antitrafficking campaign
has also resulted in significant collateral human rights damage by providing a context
for developed states to pursue a border control agenda under the cover of promoting
human rights”); Wendy Chapkis, Trafficking, Migration, and the Law: Protecting
Innocents, Punishing Immigrants, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 6, 923 (2003) (analyzing how the
TVPA facilitates anti-immigration policies at the expense of aiding trafficked persons);
Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The
Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULT. & SOC’Y 45 (2010) (arguing that anti-trafficking coalitions of
Christian evangelical activists and some feminists prefer and have spurred a criminal
justice approach to human trafficking that results in high rates of incarceration and
enhanced border security).
66 See Shamir, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that “while human rights are
concerned with the power of the individual relative to the state, labor rights have
tended to be more collective oriented, focusing on the power of groups of workers
(‘labor’) in relation to employers (‘capital’)”).
67 See Karen Engle, “Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among
Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
189, 189-90 (2007) (arguing that human rights and women’s rights are used to justify armed
interventions contra traditional humanitarian goals); Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn
to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 75, 76 (2004).
68 See, e.g., Brooke Grona-Robb, Prosecuting Human Traffickers, PROSECUTOR,
Sept.-Oct. 2010 (explaining in part how some officers and prosecutors might see
prostitution instead of human trafficking, and vice versa); Katy Steinmetz, Oakland
Launches Pimp-Shaming Website, TIME (July 2, 2014), http://time.com/2946597/oaklandlaunches-pimp-shaming-website [http://perma.cc/6LD4-2K7K] (describing an Oakland
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from an overzealous inclusionary impulse, less severe forms of
labor-sector human trafficking have been largely excluded from
legal action or inquiry. The discretionary differentiation between
human trafficking and non-sex-sector forms of labor exploitation
has yet to be fully appreciated, analyzed, or theorized. This gap
persists despite efforts to reorder the relationship between human
trafficking and forced labor, complicating the definitional
boundaries that delimit not only human trafficking and slavery,
but also lesser exploitation and slavery. This gap persists in part
due to the early and enduring framing of human trafficking as
gender violence.69
A gender violence paradigm construes the wrong of
human trafficking specifically as one of violence against women.
Crucially, this conceptualization of human trafficking is amenable
to criminal law and human rights approaches and remedies,
which tend to focus on punishing individual wrongdoers or
enhancing individual rights, respectively. Both criminal law and
human rights paradigms demand an enhanced state presence, if
not the express involvement of an international governing order
or transnational alliance of states, in curbing the occurrence of
gendered sexual violence. It is therefore important to note that
while gender violence could be addressed outside of the criminal
justice system, in practice, charges of gender violence—largely
understood as sexual violence and as violations of women’s
human rights—are often couched in the language of criminal
justice and trigger a criminal justice response.70
A human rights approach therefore does not necessarily
threaten, but rather can encourage, the recognition of sexual
violence (if not all forms of human trafficking) as a crime that
transverses domestic and international registers.71 Under a human
rights paradigm, “women’s human rights” are increasingly
police campaign that all but equated human trafficking with prostitution, whether
coerced or chosen).
69 See, e.g., Chang & Kim, supra note 37, at 320-21 (arguing that enforcement
agencies’ focus on sex trafficking neglects the larger trafficking phenomenon).
70 See, e.g., KIRSTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE 1-2 (2008) (analyzing
how feminist efforts to end sexual violence have fostered a troubling alliance with the
neoliberal state and criminal justice system); JEFFREY FAGAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 25-27 (1996),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf [http://perma.cc/YD9R-RZNZ] (detailing how
the criminalization of domestic violence can fail to address its realities and arguing for
the presence of informal or extralegal modes of redress).
71 See,
e.g., Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, U.N.
Doc. E/2002/68/Add. 1, at 3-4 (2002), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
Traffickingen.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6J4-JBU4].
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understood as gendered protections against violence, specifically
sexual violence.72 The criminal law paradigm shares this view of
sexuality as a person’s—especially a woman’s—intimate, private,
and personal province where she alone is sovereign.73 This
common take on sexuality’s centrality to individual, private selfconceptualization underpins the moral ordering of the gender
violence paradigm. This moral ordering then animates both a
criminal law paradigm (wherein gendered human trafficking is
an outrage to justice and an offense against the public) and a
human rights paradigm (wherein gendered human trafficking is
an affront to the rights of humanity, especially women).
Certainly, on questions of enforcement and remedy,
human rights and criminal law paradigms diverge on the
question of how to best nurture and protect the private sexual
self. The criminal law paradigm would ex post recruit the state
to punish sexual threats. Conversely, in some ways the human
rights paradigm would ex ante seek to augment the conditions
that would allow for the private sexual self’s flourishing,
urging an international order of states to adopt specific duties
and obligations designed to foster those ends. But this
divergence rests simply on the type of relationship between the
law and the private sexual self. It does not deny the existence
or primacy of a private sexual self, query the cultivation of a
private sexual self as a key element of freedom, or question
how or why “women’s human rights” as an abstract category
became largely synonymous with efforts to protect a private
sexual self instead of, for example, a public, economic one.
What are the consequences that flow from understanding
sex as wedded to a private, intimate self, and how do they affect
how we theorize the wrong of human trafficking? Can one “own”
one’s sexual self—is one’s sex market alienable—or is one
72 See, e.g., Rana Jaleel, Weapons of Sex, Weapons of War: Feminisms, Ethnic
Conflict and the Rise of Rape and Sexual Violence in Public International Law During
the 1990s, 27 CULTURAL STUD. 1 (2013).
73 This autonomy/bodily integrity/equality fusion is supported throughout
constitutional case law and ties in to how we understand slavery. See infra Part V; see
also Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in
Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 349 (2006)
(describing how abolitionists argued “that prostitution necessarily constitutes a form of
trafficking because it necessarily reproduces and enforces subordination of women by
men”); Melissa Farley, Preface to PROSTITUTION, TRAFFICKING, AND TRAUMATIC STRESS
xi, xiv (Melissa Farley ed., 2003); KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY
1 (1995); Dorchen Leidholdt, Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights, 1
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 133-37 (1993); Catharine MacKinnon, Prostitution and
Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 28 (1993).
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indistinguishable from it? Does one’s sexual self lie at the heart of
one’s humanness, indivisible from it?
These questions have persisted since the earliest human
trafficking jurisprudence, which concerned the twentiethcentury obsession with “white slavery,” or the movement of
women across borders for sexually exploitative purposes. In
1904, the International Agreement for the Suppression of
White Slave Traffic was adopted.74 Additional conventions were
signed in 1910,75 1921,76 1933,77 and 1950.78 Each of these antitrafficking/anti-slavery initiatives were passed at historical
moments when labor—particularly women’s labor and
therefore also women’s social roles—were in great upheaval.
At the beginning of the twentieth century,
industrialization and the movement of unsupervised working
class girls into city factory work prompted anxieties about sexual
propriety. The 1920s, 1930s, and 1950s also saw shifting labor
demographics following economic turmoil and world war.79 The
1990s, which kicked off our current human trafficking legal
regime, witnessed a new phase of global labor migration and
economic interdependency at the end of the Cold War.80
This history suggests that human trafficking law has
always attempted to mediate social concerns (particularly in the
U.S. context) about what separates legitimate labor from acts of
slavery—and has done so through the social category of gender.
This millennium’s early U.S. prostitution reform debates, which
dominated early human trafficking legal efforts,81 are no exception.
At issue was the question of whether prostitution, including
noncoerced or chosen prostitution, would be understood as sexual
slavery and subsequently abolished, or as sex work subject to labor
74 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic,
May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83.
75 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic,
May 4, 1910, 98 U.N.T.S. 101.
76 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, opened for signature Sept. 30, 1921, 53 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force Mar.
31, 1922).
77 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of
Full Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 150 L.N.T.S. 431.
78 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96
U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 1951).
79 See MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING
ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885-1920 (Linda K. Kerber &
Nell Irvin Painter eds., 1995); SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 65-66 (1991).
80 See SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW 186 (1990).
81 See, e.g., Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1657-58.
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regulations and protections. Beneath the prostitution reform
controversy lurk legal and intra-feminist disagreements on the
broader relationships between gender, sex, labor, race, and the
meaning of freedom, not to mention the scope and aptness of
theorizing gender justice through violence.
A gender violence approach to human trafficking has been
especially pernicious given contemporary human trafficking law’s
bifurcation of “sexual exploitation” from “labor exploitation.”82
Singling out the sexual as a distinct category of exploitation has
furthered the conflation of human trafficking with the gendered
and sexualized victimization of women and children.83 This
selective reading of human trafficking law downplays the
prevalence of non-sex-sector trafficked workers while offering a
vexed portrait of the relationship between women, sex, and
violence that often silences the inquiry into whether “sex work” can
be a consensual, chosen economic vocation—however limited the
set of “choices” may be—instead of a criminal act.84 Moreover, a
gender violence approach risks rendering men who are trafficked
for commercial sex purposes invisible.85 It also creates a false divide
between sex-sector trafficking and other forms of labor trafficking,
all while erroneously masking the sizable sexual vulnerability of
those who are trafficked into non-sex-sector forms of work.86
These heated and protracted debates are significant and
ongoing. Critical to any effort to distinguish the wrong of
human trafficking, they implicate far more than the criminal
law paradigm per se. They bear on what the labor migration
paradigm conceives of as “labor,” the meaning of gender justice
and human rights, as well as the legal meaning and social
import of slavery.
Sex work advocates, whether they champion prostitution
and other commercial sex practices as viable career paths or
ultimately strive to reduce or eradicate their occurrence, contend
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
84 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 276-85
(1999) (arguing that taking money in exchange for sexual services is analogous to
other types of work).
85 See Tien, supra note 37.
86 See, e.g., GRACE MENG, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CULTIVATING FEAR: THE
VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT FARMWORKERS IN THE US TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0512
ForUpload_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3EQ-3Z8L]; Amanda M. Kjar, U-Visa Certification
Requirement is Blocking Congressional Intent Creating the Need for A Writ of Mandate
and Training—Undocumented Immigrant Female Farmworkers Remain Hiding in the
Fields of Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment, 22 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 141,
142 (2013).
82
83
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that such activities are work.87 In this view, those who perform
such work deserve the full spectrum of labor protections that
would accompany any other employment. A sex work approach to
human trafficking understands its wrong in the language of
labor—as unprotected, dangerous work often performed by
women who may find themselves unable to find other gainful
employment.88 Crucially, understanding the core wrong of human
trafficking’s sexual exploitation element as materially similar to
its labor exploitation element helps right the imbalance that pulls
the lion’s share of legal attention towards sex-sector trafficking,
rendering human trafficking all but synonymous with sexual
exploitation. It can also correct for the gendered imbalance and
moral judgment that often attends discussions of prostitution and
other commercial sex acts by shifting attention away from the
sexual self (whose alleged private nature is imminently
debatable)89 and towards the structural economic realities faced
by global low-wage workers.
The continuities between a sex work approach and a
broader labor migration paradigm are worth emphasizing,
particularly in our current historical moment when labor and
slavery paradigms are each paradoxically on the ascent. What the
early human trafficking paradigms show is the continuous give
and take between punishing wrongdoers whose actions injure
humanity (the transnational criminal law paradigm), the shaping
of a clearer notion of what protections humanity by birthright
deserves (the human rights and gender justice paradigms), and
the acknowledgement of the material conditions and economic
frailties of workers (via a sex work/labor paradigm). From each
vantage, the meaningfulness and role of consent as a marker of
87 It is important to see how the goals of human rights (to “preserve the
visibility of the person as an individual” and emphasize freedom of choice) can dovetail
with labor perspectives. See Halley et al., supra note 73, at 350. After all, labor rights are
human rights. See Gallagher, supra note 32, at 847 (“From its earliest days to the
present, human rights law has loudly proclaimed the fundamental immorality and
unlawfulness of one person appropriating the legal personality, labor, or humanity of
another.”). But a traditional labor paradigm does not place individual rights holders at
the center of the legal problem. See Shamir, supra note 18, at 80 (“Individual and
collective labor and employment rights emerged in the attempt to bring about structural
changes to labor markets that would strengthen workers’ bargaining positions and,
eventually, lead to the redistribution of wealth between capital and labor. They are,
therefore, better suited than the traditional human rights tools for addressing the
institutional aspects of the labor market exploitation on which trafficking is structured.”).
88 The ILO has taken tentative steps to recognize sex work as labor. See, e.g.,
ILO GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 196 (noting that forced labor occurs in private,
where it is difficult to monitor and enforce labor law, and can involve commercial sex).
89 See Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex To Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139,
1141 (1998) (arguing for an understanding of how the concept of sexuality functions
socially that is not overly focused on private sexual identity or private sexual acts).
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individual freedom assumes greater or lesser importance,
depending on how each paradigm values individual choice versus
structural or collective rights within its analysis of freedom.
Unlike the transnational criminal law, human rights, and gender
violence paradigms, the labor migration paradigm and the new
low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm each understand labor
market structures and poor employment conditions as underlying
the wrong of human trafficking, thus moving away from an
emphasis on individual choice or wrongdoing.
II.

THE LABOR MIGRATION PARADIGM OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Individual harms of equality and autonomy figure
prominently in each of the dominant approaches to understanding
the wrong of human trafficking. While human trafficking does
undoubtedly cause individual people individual damage,
centering the individual at the heart of an analysis of human
trafficking is a grave error. An overt focus on individual harm
obscures the structural conditions that drive human trafficking—
the inner workings of global labor markets and poor employment
conditions that are not well regulated, if regulated at all.
In recognition of the shortcomings of the dominant
paradigmatic approaches to human trafficking, a labor perspective
has recently emerged. This labor approach frames human
trafficking as an issue of power, focusing ex ante on the structural
imbalances that characterize work relationships in “labor sectors
susceptible to [human] trafficking.”90 As labor law scholar Hila
Shamir explains, to address the labor wrong of human trafficking,
a labor paradigm “turns to strategies of collective action and
bargaining, protective employment legislation, and contextual
standard setting, in its attempt to remedy the unequal power
relations in labor sectors susceptible to trafficking.”91 Such an
approach would empower states and relevant international
agencies to assume a strong and active role in regulating the legal
backdrop against which global markets function.92 A labor
approach also
calls attention to other elements of the legal order that shape power
relations in labor markets, such as the background rules of private law
(including, for example, property, contracts, and torts), immigration
regimes, relevant trade policies, criminal law, border-crossing practices,
and certain welfare policies, to the extent that these elements of the
90
91
92

Shamir, supra note 18, at 81-82.
Id.
Id.
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legal order affect the bargaining positions of the parties to a labor
contract in various labor sectors.93

The emerging labor paradigm, however, has retained a focus on
extreme migrant exploitation, splintering the full potential of
human trafficking law.
A.

The Rise of a Labor Approach to Human Trafficking

Suspending the question of whether prostitution should be
abolished, decriminalized, or regulated like any other kind of
work, a groundswell of noted legal scholars nonetheless agree: the
early overemphasis on gendered sexual exploitation—be it
through criminal law, human rights, gender violence, or gender
equality paradigms—has overshadowed other forms of
exploitation expressly targeted by human trafficking law, namely
non-sex-sector labor exploitation.94 Recent U.S. and international
human trafficking law and policy have mirrored this scholarly
consensus, quietly steering anti-trafficking efforts beyond
prostitution reform debates. In 2010, the Obama administration
effectively reversed the Bush administration’s equation of
voluntary prostitution with human trafficking. As the State
Department’s 2010 TIP Report states, “Prostitution by willing
adults is not human trafficking regardless of whether it is
legalized, decriminalized, or criminalized.”95

Id.
See Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin Grey Legal Lines
Between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 48 (2009) (criticizing the distinction between human trafficking and
“ordinary” labor migration as a “false dichotomy”); Daryl Li, Offshoring the Army:
Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military, 62 UCLA L. REV. 124 (2015) (noting the nascent
prevalence of labor analyses of human trafficking while detailing the insufficiency of the
TVPA to protect third-country national workers who are contracted by the U.S. military
from extreme labor abuse); Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at 611 (noting how
recent interpretations of human trafficking law have made “the concept of labor itself
explicitly relevant to a field that had long been narrowly focused on sexual exploitation”);
Note, Counteracting the Bias: The Department of Labor’s Unique Opportunity to Combat
Human Trafficking, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1012 (2013) [hereinafter, Counteracting the Bias]
(arguing that human trafficking is increasingly understood as falling along a spectrum of
abusive labor practices and detailing the Department of Labor’s mandate and renewed
efforts to address human trafficking).
95 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2010). In
contrast, see the 2004 U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, which views prostitution,
voluntary or otherwise, as a correlate if not a cause of human trafficking, stating that
“where prostitution has been legalized or tolerated, there is an increase in the demand
for sex slaves.” BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: THE LINK
BETWEEN PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (2004), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/rls/38790.htm [http://perma.cc/VX6B-8GRH].
93
94
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Meanwhile, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
has attempted to exert new authority within human trafficking
law through its close association with forced labor, a bailiwick
of the ILO. In recognition of the prevalence of human
trafficking and other “modern forms of slavery,” the ILO has
recently adopted a new and legally binding Protocol to ILO
Convention No. 29, the 1930 Forced Labour Convention.96
Touted as “bring[ing] the existing ILO Convention [No.] 29
Concerning Forced Labour . . . into the modern era” to address
practices such as human trafficking, the Protocol “establishes a
common framework for the 177 ILO member states that have
ratified Convention [No.] 29.”97
Specifically, the Protocol strengthens the international
legal framework by creating new obligations to prevent forced
labor, protect trafficked persons, and provide access to remedies—
including compensation—regardless of trafficked persons’ legal
status.98 The Protocol encourages intergovernmental cooperation,
including bilateral and multilateral agreements, to eradicate
forced labor and human trafficking for the purposes of forced or
compulsory labor.99 Crucially, the Protocol requires governments
to take measures to better protect workers, particularly lowskilled migrant workers, from fraudulent and abusive
recruitment practices.100
The ILO’s interest in human trafficking as a form of forced
labor serves as a corrective to the organization’s notable absence
in the discussions that culminated in the drafting and adoption of
the U.N. Trafficking Protocol.101 The ILO’s involvement has

96 Int’l Labour Org., Text of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930,
ILO Doc. 9A (June 11, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_246615.pdf [http://perma.cc/HH6Q-BKCR].
97 Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., ILO Adopts New Protocol to Tackle Modern
Forms of Forced Labour (June 11, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mediacentre/press-releases/WCMS_246549/lang--en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/EN6R-JTAC].
98 See Text of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, supra note
96, at 6-8.
99 Id. at 8. The ILO does not assume that all forced labor is human
trafficking, noting that “[f]orced labour, contemporary forms of slavery, debt bondage
and human trafficking are closely related terms though not identical in a legal sense.
Most situations of slavery or human trafficking are however covered by ILO’s definition
of forced labour.” The Meanings of Forced Labour, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/news/WCMS_237569/lang--en/index.htm
[http://perma.cc/C48D-MEQ7].
100 See Text of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, supra note
96, at 6.
101 See, e.g., Director-General of the Int’l Labour Org., Stopping Forced Labour:
Global Report Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles
and Rights of Work, 48, 100 (2001), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-

2016]

THE WAGES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

591

transformed the tenor of the legal debates over what human
trafficking essentially is by portraying the wrong of human
trafficking as a labor wrong and abandoning the Bush
administration’s interpretive lens of gendered morality. While
this nascent labor paradigm is an improvement, it is not without
limitations. The ILO has managed to shift the focus of human
trafficking debates only by building on the legal architecture of
extant human trafficking law. That law, grounded in the logic of
transnational crime, understands human trafficking in ways that
collapse distinctions between consensual economic migration and
the act of movement thought necessary to support a charge of
human trafficking. While the Obama administration and the ILO
thus recognize a labor wrong (among a muddle of others) at the
heart of human trafficking, they adopt a specific species of labor
as the object of their best efforts: migrant labor.
B.

Construing Labor as Migrant Labor

The turn to migrant labor as the object of human
trafficking law is also reflected in an emerging consensus among
both labor and human trafficking legal scholars, who contend that
a labor paradigm attuned to the vulnerabilities of migrant labor
best recognizes and addresses the harms of human trafficking.102
This paradigm casts human trafficking as largely the lot of the
poor and the foreign who find themselves funneled into
commercial sex work, construction, food service, home health
care, agricultural work, or other forms of low-wage, poorly
regulated labor with little recourse to the labor and employment
protections enjoyed by native born or citizen workers.103
To stem the tide of human trafficking, some scholars,
like Hila Shamir, advocate for a general strengthening of the
complex of laws (labor, criminal, and private) that affect
structural relationships between employers and employees.104
--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_publ_9221119483_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/9
FQT-7VVY].
102 See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 56, at 547; Shamir, supra note 18, at 79-80;
Counteracting the Bias, supra note 94, at 1013.
103 The emphasis on migrant labor is due in part to a conflation of certain
categories of work and the migrant status of the worker. For example, the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is often cited as a law that fails migrant workers because
it defines the term “employee” to exclude in part “any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home.”
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). While agricultural and
domestic workers do not categorically enjoy the protections of the NLRA, the Act makes
no distinction between migrant and nonmigrant workers. Id.
104 See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 18, at 81-82.
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Others, like labor and constitutional law expert James Gray
Pope, suggest that the prohibition against “new slavery”105
should incorporate support for “selected labor rights,” including
the right to change employers, the right to bargain collectively,
and the right to freedom of association, among others.106 Pope’s
approach would help secure what legal scholar Karen Bravo
calls “free labor” (or the ability of workers to freely alienate
their labor across borders via a liberal trade and migration
regime)107 in part by affording migrant workers the same
protections provided to citizens.108
Yet how recent interpretative changes in the conceptual
meaning of human trafficking affect the operational parameters
of human trafficking law is not assessed or explained in these
works.109 Where human trafficking begins and lesser exploitation
ends “remains hotly contested”110—especially with the absence of
any movement requirement and the simultaneous reordering of
all human trafficking as slavery. Setting the wrong of human
trafficking as a low-wage/vulnerable labor one helps shift the
parameters of human trafficking debates towards the free
approach advanced by these scholars while integrating the labor
conditions of native/citizen workers more firmly into analyses of
exploitation—what it is and how it operates.
As the prior analysis of the dominant paradigms shows,
the act of movement or recruitment was at the outset considered
uniquely critical in isolating and recognizing a specific population
thought to be particularly vulnerable to exploitation, namely
migrants or internally displaced persons. From the first, antitrafficking law targeted the harms and vulnerabilities associated
with migration, aiming to protect the least protected persons for
whom migrants served as the model: those people without or
unable to access home state protections—people in flux. Debates
105 James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2010); see also Bravo, supra note 56 (advocating for a “free
labor” approach to human trafficking that eliminates barriers to migration and secures
work protections for migrant laborers).
106 Pope, supra note 105, at 1853; see also Bravo, supra note 56, at 557.
107 Bravo, supra note 56, at 547 (arguing that “through the liberalization of
labor, economic and trade liberalization principles and theories can be used to harness
the power of the market to combat human trafficking and to further human rights
protection as a whole”).
108 Id.; see also Pope, supra note 105, at 1870.
109 See also Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually
Forgotten Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607 (2012) (arguing
that the resuscitation of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 might aid federal efforts to
prosecute human trafficking).
110 Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1656-57.
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about the movement requirement remained debates about how to
best protect, first and foremost—if not exclusively—this at-risk
population. As the ILO explained its adherence to the movement
requirement, trafficked forced laborers “are probably even worse
off than non-trafficked victims” who were thought to exercise
greater degrees of agency and control over work conditions.111
Recognizing that labor paradigm advocates have focused
on migrant labor for legal, strategic, and ideological reasons
illuminates how their position has not kept pace with
transformations in how we interpret the elements necessary for a
criminal or even civil charge of human trafficking. Other scholars
have understood these developments as an “unmaking” of human
trafficking law—as the destruction of the legal integrity of the
crime of human trafficking.112 Instead, I view these shifts as
indicative of the tension at the heart of the definition of human
trafficking, inscribed within the codified split between labor and
sexual
exploitation,
between
economic
and
equality
(nondiscrimination) interests, whose meanings are themselves
predicated on the paradigms adopted for their interpretation.
In this way, a labor migration paradigm—while
undoubtedly promoting the collective rights of workers—
nevertheless carries within it an embedded equality argument
rooted in group identity. It understands the rights of migrant
workers as uniquely diminished within the global market.
Migrant workers are not treated as equals to citizen workers,
who are understood as largely protected by domestic law and
able to enjoy access to shared sociocultural resources. This
dichotomized view of labor exploitation casts migrant worker
treatment as an affront to a liberal notion of freedom premised
on equality, while the low-wage/vulnerable work conditions
that engender worker exploitation regardless of citizenship
status remain outside legal attention.
Understanding the wrong of human trafficking as a labor
wrong that predominantly befalls migrant workers allows us to
see several significant harms that criminal law, human rights,
and assorted gender paradigms obscure. By framing human
trafficking as a migrant labor issue, the labor migration paradigm
111 Beate Andrees & Mariska N.J. van der Linden, Designing Trafficking
Research from a Labour Market Perspective: The ILO Experience, 43 INT’L MIGRATION
55, 64-65 (2005) (explaining the ILO’s position during the U.N. Trafficking Protocol
negotiations). The ILO’s current position regarding the relationship between human
trafficking and forced labor is currently much more nuanced. See infra Section IV.C.
112 See Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1706-08; Counteracting
the Bias, supra note 94, at 1015-16.
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foregrounds the movement of workers of all genders and
persuasions across borders or to otherwise nonnative locales.
Doing so reveals the vulnerabilities and interdependencies that
inhere in the human condition113—particularly human working
conditions—while retaining a focus on the unique vulnerabilities
of those who work beyond the borders of their homeland or place
of origin. A labor migration paradigm thus offers a particular
portrait of the inner workings of power—one where the struggle
lies in perfecting the balance of power between citizen and
noncitizen labor arrangements, specifically in sectors thought to
be vulnerable to human trafficking.
Unqualified comparison between all migrant work and
all work performed by a state’s citizenry, however, may not be
the best metric for producing sound law or policy. Differences
across work sectors, industries, and job categories may
complicate categorical claims that migrant workers are
necessarily more exploited than other workers, particularly
when the legal threshold for exploitation may be met by both
forced and psychologically coerced labor, as well as deceptive or
fraudulent recruitment practices that may cumulatively rise to
the level of actionable exploitation. Is the wrong of human
trafficking, then, best described through an unremitting, if not
legally prescribed, focus on migrant labor? What harms would be
made visible if states understood migrant labor in ways that also
assessed the conditions of low-wage work more broadly, without
recourse to worker citizenship status as an unacknowledged
template for the violation? In other words, how would we
understand the wrong of human trafficking if we reframed
human trafficking debates as issues of domestic lowwage/vulnerable work and employment conditions?
Before turning to an exploration of the new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm, it is worth noting how the
increasing willingness to recognize and address non-sex-sector
labor exploitation as legally actionable human trafficking has
been accompanied by a tendency to de-emphasize any movement
requirement and instead spotlight exploitation as the core
harm.114 Theoretically, this should push against the notion that
113

Fineman, supra note 12, at 8-12.

114

The core of human trafficking is exploitation; trafficking does not necessarily
involve movement of individuals across borders. Nevertheless, noncitizens
working in the United States are especially vulnerable: Undocumented
workers may labor under conditions in which “employers take advantage of
their status and fail to pay adequate (or any) wages, discriminate openly in
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anti-trafficking efforts should focus almost exclusively on migrant
exploitation. Yet the assumption that trafficked labor is largely, if
not exclusively, migrant labor lingers within legal descriptions of
human trafficking, even though the scope of anti-trafficking law is
less than ever limited to migrants. In other words, with the
affirmative absence of any movement requirement, the abuse that
constitutes actionable exploitation has been legally sundered from
its foundational motivation: the vulnerability of migrant workers
to various forms of organized exploitation perpetrated by
international criminal syndicates.
What persists, however, are the old ties of movement,
migrancy, and criminality. To illustrate this claim, the following
sections describe the impact of eliminating the movement
requirement on legal interpretations of human trafficking law.
These sections also explore how the transnational criminal
paradigm has conflated migrancy and movement with the harm
of trafficking in ways that keep extant labor critiques from
looking beyond severe (migrant) exploitation and towards lesser
exploitations also prohibited by law that impact migrant and
nonmigrant workers alike. Part of the exclusion of lesser labor
exploitation from analyses of human trafficking turns on the
equation of movement with migrancy and vulnerability, and
simultaneously, citizenship with access.
III.

FUSING MOVEMENT AND MIGRATION

The focus on migrant labor has occurred even as the TIP
Office has eliminated the movement requirement, demonstrating
that the kind of isolation and lack of access to resources or
remedies that characterizes human trafficking is not solely
achieved by being physically moved, either across a border or
within a state. A fusion of movement and migration as equivalent
bad acts that befall human trafficking victims has resulted in case
law that has been unable to capture the less severe forms of labor
exploitation otherwise included in anti-trafficking law. Indeed, an
understanding of movement as a prerequisite for a charge of
human trafficking relies on an inaccurate perspective of the
conditions of both migrancy and low-wage work.
the workplace, and violate labor and safety laws with impunity because of
weak laws and weak employer enforcement efforts.”
Counteracting the Bias, supra note 94, at 1014 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Leticia M. Saucedo,
A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891,
893 (2008)); see, e.g., 2012 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-14.
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The Elimination of the Movement Requirement and the
Meaning of Exploitation

The TIP Office’s disavowal of any movement requirement
is noteworthy as the United States broadens its focus on non-sexsector labor exploitation. To satisfy the “act” element in the
absence of a movement requirement, the TIP Office has adopted
expansive interpretations of the enumerated act elements,
including “harboring,” “receipt,” and “obtaining.” The Obama
administration understands these acts alone as sufficient to
support a charge of human trafficking—no movement or
recruitment by a third party is required. In this way, prior
distinctions between trafficked and nontrafficked forced labor have
conceptually crumbled, allowing the Obama administration to
subsume all forced labor within the ambit of human trafficking.115
Moreover, in the absence of a movement requirement, the
exploitation element takes on new significance in ways that
transform the relationship between the three elements (act,
means, and purpose) of the crime. With “exploitation” as an
element, early interpretations of the TVPA and the U.N. Human
Trafficking Protocol were not understood to contain an explicit
mandate to end human sexual or labor exploitation—they were
thought of instead as “process orient[ed]” proscriptions.116 These
instruments were construed as singling out only certain acts that
engender exploitation for legal action. In other words, they only
prohibit specific forms of dealing (“the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons” per the
U.N. Trafficking Protocol,117 and “the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person” per the TVPA)
in which people are exploited through force, fraud, or coercion.118
Now that exploitation and not movement has become
central to the TIP Office’s interpretation of human trafficking,119
the relationship between the act and purpose elements of human
trafficking has changed. With the act of movement that once
underpinned the meaning of “recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person” removed,
exploitation itself takes center stage. In New York City, for
instance, where state trafficking laws are not interpreted to

115
116
117
118
119

See Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at 610-11.
See Hathaway, supra note 57, at 9-11.
U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 344.
See TVPA, supra note 2.
See 2012 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-14.
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require movement,120 this has resulted in prosecutions of
employers who exploit migrant workers who have already been
in the country for some time—a fact pattern that was not always
thought to constitute human trafficking.121
As a result of this interpretation, anti-trafficking
instruments no longer function as strict process-oriented
proscriptions. Instead, they now fall in line with anti-trafficking
campaigns that aim to “end modern slavery.” This, then, is the
point where the TIP Office’s move (1) to classify all forced labor as
human trafficking and (2) to view all human trafficking as
slavery, with all its populist abolitionary appeal, converge—in an
effort to move from much-critiqued “process oriented
proscriptions” to wholesale attempts to end exploitation.
A closer analysis of the relevance of movement to the
recognition of human trafficking is illustrative in this regard.
How human trafficking law has understood migration in relation
to the movement requirement has led to problems in how the law
identifies acts of human trafficking for both migrant and
nonmigrant workers. This in turn affects how the meaning and
significance of migration, and therefore movement, shifts with the
paradigms applied to human trafficking law—even if these shifts
in meaning have been largely unacknowledged.
B.

A Critique of the Movement Requirement
1. Mistaking Migration as the Harm

The wisdom of requiring movement—not to mention
what sort of movement counts (transborder or intrastate) or
when the movement had to occur in order to count—has long
been a subject of debate. Paradigmatic shifts in interpreting,
applying, and enforcing human trafficking law have driven,
among other things, the debates over the significance of
movement to human trafficking. The debates over movement are
in essence debates about what causes the underlying conditions
that create and foster exploitation and what those underlying
conditions actually are. The early transnational criminal law
understanding of human trafficking has led to the notion that
migration in and of itself is a harmful act, which has inhibited
120 See Human Trafficking, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS.,
http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/humantraffic/ [http://perma.cc/Q8Z5-M8ED] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
121 Suzanne Tomatore & Laura Matthews-Jolly, Spotlight on 150 Human
Trafficking Cases, CITY B. JUST. CTR. (2013), http://www.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/
images/stories/pdfs/cbjc-iwc-human-trafficking.pdf [http://perma.cc/2M2G-95SH].
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the law’s ability to recognize the full range of acts prohibited by
our primary anti-trafficking instruments.
In the context of the transnational criminal law paradigm,
migration and victimhood are closely entwined. The U.N. Human
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA conceive of human trafficking
as a critical security issue deeply tied to transnational organized
crime syndicates that facilitate clandestine, often illicit, migration
and that primarily target women and children.122 As a result, for
U.S. courts, trafficked persons’ vulnerability is often tied to their
assumed status as unwitting victims far from home.123
Definitional ambiguities in the U.N. Trafficking Protocol
fostered first-stage debates on whether the crime of human
trafficking necessitated transborder movement, either across
state borders or within a single state. Indeed, equivocation over
the meaning of movement or recruitment is tied to the
conceptualization of the wrong. While authors and advocates of
the U.N. Trafficking Protocol initially understood the movement
requirement as essential to any transnational legal definition of
human trafficking,124 others questioned the effectiveness of this
approach. The issue of whether or not the U.N. Human Trafficking
Protocol named the internal recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring, or receipt of persons within a single state as actionable
human trafficking fueled accusations that the human trafficking
legal regime “while billed as key to the modern fight against
slavery, has actually promoted a very partial perspective on the
problem of modern slavery.”125
Assurances and clarifications on the legal meaning of
human trafficking soon followed. Subsequent regional and
state laws that explicitly included intrastate movement within
the auspices of human trafficking ultimately quelled debates
about intrastate movement.126 Yet the issue of the relationship
See supra Part I.
See, e.g., United States v. Chang Da Liu, 538 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008)
(involving the recruitment of Chinese women to work in a tea house and who were then
forced into prostitution); United States v. Naovasaisri, 150 Fed. Appx. 170 (3d Cir. 2005)
(involving the trafficking of “impoverished Thai women” to the United States, where they
were forced to pay off their smuggling debts through “prostitut[ion] at brothels, massage
parlors, and tanning salons”); United States v. Gasanova, 332 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2003)
(involving J-1 visa fraud in which migrant women did not conduct university research,
but were compelled to become topless dancers); Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Soto-Huarto, No. 7:03-CR-00341 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2003), ECF No. 55 (involving sex
slavery and involuntary servitude charges in a migrant labor smuggling ring turned
human trafficking case).
124 Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at 630-31.
125 Hathaway, supra note 57, at 4.
126 The European Convention against Trafficking in Persons prohibits internal
trafficking and extends the rights and obligations therein to trafficking taking place
122
123
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between movement and human trafficking is not put to rest
even with the express inclusion of intrastate movement as an
act that can trigger human trafficking liability. This enduring
tension is arguably attributable to the worry that migration,
often equated with forced movement—and not the labor
structures and employment conditions into which migrants
relocate—is itself the core harm. Early debates on the scope of
human trafficking law and the meaning of human trafficking
demonstrate the slippage between migration, movement, and
this understanding of the wrong of human trafficking.
On January 29, 1998, a roundtable on “The Meaning of
‘Trafficking in Persons’: A Human Rights Perspective” was held
in Washington, D.C., by the International Human Rights Law
Group. Convened by the Women’s Rights Advocacy Program
(WRAP) of the International Human Rights Law Group with
the assistance of the Harvard Law School Human Rights
Program, participants included human rights activists,
scholars, and professionals, who sought to end the human
rights abuses of human trafficking and hone a precise working
definition of “human trafficking.”127 All present roundly rejected
any border-crossing requirement, be it international, national,
state, or intrastate, noting that “the harm to victims can be the
same whether they are moved two miles across a national
border or 1,000 miles within national boundaries.”128 For those
present, certain “factors” associated with border crossing—not
the physical act of crossing a border itself—lay at the heart of
human trafficking. The factors generated and agreed upon by
roundtable participants included “movement to a foreign or
unfamiliar milieu; victims having illegal or non-national
status; language, cultural or other barriers; and separation
from family and community.”129 Nonetheless, roundtable
participants still deemed it “unfitting and inappropriate that a
change in status or conditions without any physical transport,
movement or travel should qualify as [human] trafficking.”130
within as well as across national borders. Council of Europe Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings and its Explanatory Report Ch. I, May 16, 2005,
C.E.T.S. No. 197 [hereinafter European Trafficking Convention]. The official
commentary to the European Trafficking Convention stressed that “trafficking in
human beings does not necessarily involve a transnational element: it can exist at [the]
national level.” Id. § I(a) at ¶ 7.
127 Ali Miller & Alison N. Stewart, Report from the Roundtable on the Meaning
of “Trafficking in Persons”: A Human Rights Perspective, 20 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 11,
11 (1998).
128 Id. at 14.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 15.
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The rationales for this declaration are not elaborated in
the record. What this assertion and omission indicate is the
degree to which migration itself is viewed as a harmful act. Here,
movement or migration becomes an act instigated (or enabled) by
a wrongdoer that is both evidence of wrongdoing and is itself a
kind of harm—a direct result of approaching human trafficking
through a transnational criminal law framework.
This slippage between the movement requirement,
migration, and the harm of human trafficking is on full display in
early efforts to distinguish human trafficking from human
smuggling.131 While the definition of human trafficking turns on
the existence of forceful, coercive, or fraudulent dealings that lead
to sexual or labor exploitation, human smuggling has been
historically understood as “a consensual and relatively benign
market-based response to the existence of laws that seek
artificially to constrain the marriage of surplus labor supply on
one side of a border with unmet demand for certain forms of labor
on the other side of that border.”132 The transnational
criminalization of human trafficking, however, revivified and
entrenched aggressive state border securitization and policing
strategies, resulting in the attendant criminalization of human
smuggling. The U.N. Trafficking Protocol and its parent
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime133 sought to
facilitate interstate cooperation to stamp out human trafficking,
intercept traffickers, and control borders through standardized
practices such as information exchange, mutual legal assistance,
and repatriation procedures.134
By ignoring the market dynamics that put workers’ bodies
in migratory motion and framing efforts to work and survive as
illicit criminal enterprises, the transnational criminalization of
human smuggling is in essence the transnational criminalization
of a market-responsive labor practice.135 Economic migration and
the act of movement necessary for a charge of human trafficking
were thus conceptually fused and, as such, became the targets of
anti-trafficking law. As a result, subsequent attempts to correct
131 Prohibited human smuggling entails “the procurement, in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a
person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent
resident.” Migrants Smuggling Protocol, supra note 51, § I, art. 3(a).
132 Hathaway, supra note 57, at 5.
133 See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3; United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
134 U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 343-47; Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 133, at 293-95.
135 See Hathaway, supra note 57, at 5.

2016]

THE WAGES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

601

for the excesses of the transnational criminal law paradigm
retained a heavy, if not exclusive, focus on migrant labor.
This emphasis all but removed the nonmigrant workers
whose conditions of work might trigger a charge of human
trafficking from legal attention and analysis. The weighty
charge of transnational criminality ensured a focus on more
extreme forms of exploitation, keeping lesser exploitations
prohibited by anti-trafficking law beyond legal purview. Perhaps
most critically, the construal of migration as a harm in and of
itself has helped preclude critical analyses of how duties and
responsibilities are allocated between employers and employees.
In other words, the broad nature of the work relationship has
often been obscured by a too-narrow focus on the legal status of
the worker and the attendant, misguided assumption that the
harm, and in fact the wrong of human trafficking, lies in the act
of movement/migration itself.
2. Rethinking the Relationship Between Movement,
Migration, and Harm
When migration is recognized as value neutral, as
potentially chosen and compelled by a desire to find work, even
“bad” work, the legal significance of movement changes.
Movement becomes a cipher for a social or structural lack of
access to resources or options instead of something imposed or
instigated by bad actors on unwitting victims. Movement
becomes a proxy, in other words, for isolation, not simply forced
migration. Indeed, when confronted with the choice to seek
protection as victims of human trafficking or portray themselves
as workers fighting for their rights, RESPECT, a network of
European migrant domestic workers whose acronym stands for
“Rights Equality Solidarity Power Europe Co-operation
Today,”136 rejected the human trafficking framework, which they
felt compromised their efforts to overcome “the feeling of
powerlessness among the migrants” and failed to promote “the
regularization of undocumented migrants as workers.”137 In
understanding irregular or illegal labor migration as integral to
136 Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe are Contributing to European
Family Life, to European Economic Growth and to European Welfare Systems, RESPECT,
http://www.respectnetworkeu.org/ [http://perma.cc/SM7J-AW8S] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
137 Helen Schwenken, “Domestic Slavery” Versus “Workers Rights”: Political
Mobilizations of Migrant Domestic Workers in the European Union 11 (Ctr. for Comparative
Immigration Studies, Univ. of Calif., San Diego, Working Paper No. 116, 2005),
http://www.antigone.gr/files/en/library/selected-publications-on-migration-and-asylum/eu/
070506.pdf [http://perma.cc/85NE-CYC6].
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the global economy, they further alleged that the mainstream
legal fight against human trafficking “delegitimize[s] and even
destroy[s] safer mechanisms of irregular migration.”138
If the differing relationships between migration,
movement, and vulnerability seem subtle, they are nonetheless
significant in legal diagnoses of human trafficking. As the
members of RESPECT attest, vulnerability does not stem from
migration, even irregular migration. Rather, it emerges from
within the larger labor and immigration structures in which it
occurs, if not the strictures of human trafficking law itself, when
it is interpreted as a process-oriented proscription that focuses
legal attention on some kinds of exploitation but not others. In
other words, it is the failure to enact and enforce basic labor
protections and employment laws that creates vulnerability and
isolation, not the act of migration or movement itself.
Thinking through what differentiates trafficked forced
labor from nontrafficked forced labor evinces this point. For
example, to explain its early adherence to the movement
requirement, the ILO relied on the notion that trafficked forced
laborers are “probably even worse off than non-trafficked
victims,” who were thought to exercise greater degrees of
agency and control over work conditions.139 This distinction,
however, is not persuasive.
First, there is a temporal issue with the way that
trafficked and nontrafficked forced labor has been differentiated.
It is fairly noncontroversial that a migrant worker who is
smuggled across a border and/or recruited by an agency or other
intermediary into a textbook forced labor situation, where the
worker’s wages are withheld and the worker is compelled to labor
under threat of violence, would be considered a victim of human
trafficking. Indeed, second only to sex-sector human trafficking,
this is the classic human trafficking scenario.140 If, however, a

Id.
See Andrees & van der Linden, supra note 111, at 65.
140 See, e.g., United States v. Maka, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60823 (D. Haw.
Aug. 8, 2008) (involving the smuggling and forced labor of migrant workers from Tonga
to a Hawaiian pig farm); United States v. Ramos, 130 F. App’x 415, 417 (2005)
(involving a labor contractor found guilty of involuntary servitude for smuggling
undocumented migrant laborers to Florida citrus growers); United States v. Bradley,
390 F.3d 145, 148-49 (1st Cir. 2004) (involving the procurement and compulsion of
migrant workers into agricultural work); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057,
1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (containing class action claims by Malian child plaintiffs who
were allegedly trafficked by cocoa growers into Cote D’Ivoire and forced to work in
cocoa fields that supplied cocoa beans to defendants); Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1256, 1270 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (involving Title VII race and national
138
139
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migrant worker is recruited by an agency, works for a period of
months without incident, changes employers, and is then subject
to the same sort of exploitation, should this count as human
trafficking? Is the worker’s migrant status the primary source of
vulnerability? Or is it the working conditions that are at issue?
This scenario is far from a mere hypothetical. As mentioned
previously, in New York City, where state laws expressly disavow
movement as a requirement for human trafficking, the New York
City Bar Justice Center’s Immigrant Women and Children Project
(IWC) reports that such is the case with many of their clients.141
This example demonstrates how, with the abandonment of the
movement requirement, legal interpretations of human trafficking
law are coming closer to understanding the wrong of human
trafficking as a labor and employment wrong that may befall
migrant or nonmigrant workers—even if this is currently
underacknowledged and underexplored. When nothing in either
the U.N. Trafficking Protocol or the TVPA limits their application
to migrant workers, what but an unexamined fusion between
migrancy and vulnerability—one that crowds out a robust
examination of nonmigrant worker vulnerability—can account for
the current conceptual approach to human trafficking, which treats
labor exploitation as almost exclusively a migrant labor problem?142
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm begins a
conversation to remedy these issues. In recognizing human
trafficking’s wrong as a new low-wage/vulnerable labor one, the
intuitive meaning of the movement requirement is preserved—
namely, the vulnerability of living dislocated from institutional
or social redress. Instead of rigorously inhering in the act of
movement, however, isolation might also be achieved through
the accumulation of poor working conditions and the lack of
meaningful avenues of redress, which, as the U.S. context
shows, affects migrant and nonmigrant workers alike, albeit to
varying degrees.
origin discrimination claims for the hiring of East Indian migrant workers for
employment in a joint venture between John Pickle Co. and a Kuwaiti company).
141 Tomatore & Matthews-Jolly, supra note 121 (noting that “[m]igration and
trafficking need not be contemporaneous” and that “[m]any IWC clients were trafficked
years after migrating”).
142 See Andrees & van der Linden, supra note 111, at 64 (“[S]ince both those
who are subject to coercion at the outset of the migration project as well as those
subject to coercion at a later stage are victims of severe exploitation, the academically
interesting distinction between trafficked versus non-traffick[ed] victims of forced
labour becomes obsolete at a policy and legislation level. The conception of trafficking
as a cross-border phenomenon, maintained by many actors in the field of trafficking, is
not conducive to concerted action that encompasses all victims. Indeed, it should not
matter when or where the coercion started, but that a person was subjected to it.”).
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This is not to suggest that “forced labor [should] be
equated simply with low wages or poor working conditions . . . [or]
situations of pure economic necessity, as when a worker feels
unable to leave a job because of the real or perceived absence of
employment alternatives.”143 Rather, the new low-wage/vulnerable
labor paradigm is a first step towards recognizing the
unacknowledged breadth of our contemporary anti-trafficking
instruments. Crucially, the new paradigm is no lofty theoretical
imposition, but rather is an analytic synthesis of new legal
interpretations of the elements of human trafficking and social
scientific research. Both advocate for more frequent and sustained
legal attention to labor exploitation and working conditions in the
context of human trafficking. For these reasons, the new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm best describes the core wrong of
human trafficking.
IV.

A THIN LINE: HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE NEW LOWWAGE/VULNERABLE LABOR PARADIGM

The preceding sections provide two new, fundamental
insights about the current legal approach to human trafficking:
(1) dominant paradigms fail to capture the full range of acts
prohibited by human trafficking’s primary legal instruments; and
(2) even the emerging labor approach, which does a better job of
describing the wrong of human trafficking than the criminal law,
gender violence, or human rights paradigms, hamstrings the full
potential of human trafficking law through the unacknowledged
use of migrant labor as a template for understanding human
trafficking. The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm not only
addresses the shortcomings of prior efforts to interpret human
trafficking law but is also consistent with attempts to construe
human trafficking law as mandating the end of exploitation.
A.

Human Trafficking as a Low-Wage/Vulnerable Labor
Problem

The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm proposes
that the wrong of human trafficking may lie in the nature of lowwage work itself, depending on how we as a society choose to
configure the relationship between equality, labor, and freedom.
In this spirit, I use the word “vulnerable” in an inclusionary way.
“Vulnerable” can both describe precarious low-wage labor and
143

See ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 5.
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encompass acts that are not paid a wage or recognized as work
(including, in many cases, prostitution or other commercial sex
acts). Recourse to vulnerability theory also emphasizes how a
worker’s susceptibility to exploitation is both context specific and
inherent in the human condition. As new sociological scholarship
reveals, “[w]orkplace violations are not limited to immigrant
workers or other vulnerable groups in the labor force—everyone is
at risk, although to different degrees.”144 With this understanding,
I reference vulnerability, following Martha Albertson Fineman, as
a methodological commitment to analyzing structural and
institutional distributions of advantage and disadvantage that
exceed a discrimination-based model’s narrow focus on individual
identity.145 In the present case, vulnerability theory compels an
analysis of human trafficking that looks beyond legal status
designations (i.e., citizenship) to interrogate the broader
institutional and social arrangements that put people at risk.
Vulnerability theory complements recent labor law
scholarship that aims to make the law responsive and reflective of
the changing nature of work in a globalized economy. This
scholarship reconceptualizes the foundations of labor law by basing
the extension of social protections on labor-force membership
status—not the employment relationship. Alain Supiot takes this
position, locating labor-force membership status in work, which
differs from activity because work “results from an obligation,
whether voluntarily undertaken or compulsorily imposed.”146
Foregrounding the wrong of human trafficking in this way
captures the full range of offenses proscribed by human
trafficking law, from labor performed pursuant to enslavement to
deceptive or coercive exploitation. It does so by understanding
that the wrong that binds this range of exploitative practices is a
collective wrong that inheres in the inner workings of global labor
markets and manifests in employment conditions.
To flesh out these potentials, the following section
contrasts a recent report describing low-wage work conditions in
the United States with a 2009 ILO Global Report authored in
conjunction with the European Union. The ILO Global Report is
an attempt to capture more legally actionable incidents of human
trafficking—albeit with a specific focus on migrant labor. In the
same spirit, 2009 also witnessed the release of a Delphi method
BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
146 See ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE 54 (2001).
144
145
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survey, implemented by the ILO and the European Commission,
identifying operational indicators used to diagnose the presence of
human trafficking. The report departs from a definition of human
trafficking as tantamount solely to slavery. Instead, it focuses on
how to recognize less extreme versions of human trafficking,
listing combinations of acts or violations that alone would not
suggest its occurrence, but that together offer a vision of human
trafficking as a cumulative accretion of workplace violations.
Here, the trafficked person at issue belies the iconic image of the
shackled sex slave or other worker trapped and forced to labor in
slave-like conditions. Instead, the trafficked person more closely
resembles someone trapped in the low-wage labor market.
Read in tandem, these two reports demonstrate the need
for a thorough reconceptualization of the wrong of human
trafficking as a baseline for developing targeted and effective
action against it. This can be accomplished by recognizing how
latent equality arguments are embedded within a labor migration
paradigm in ways that draw a false distinction between trafficked
migrant labor and other low-wage and vulnerable work. This
division, while preserving the legal integrity of a vision of human
trafficking defined by force, violence, and slavery, may in fact
generate anti-trafficking efforts that fail to address “less
extreme,” but equally proscribed forms of human trafficking—or
worse, actively contribute to their flourishing.
B.

Cumulative Labor Violations as Human Trafficking

In “A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking,” Hila
Shamir states that the majority of scholars and activists agree
that a “certain ‘seriousness’ threshold” must be reached before a
detrimental employment practice may be deemed human
trafficking.147 And yet the threshold requirements are anything
but clear: “uncertainty remains as to what exactly constitutes
[human] trafficking.”148 Anne T. Gallagher concurred, noting that
beyond this seriousness threshold, “the lines [delineating human
trafficking] remain blurred.”149 The ambiguity surrounding what
constitutes exploitation, as well as the porousness of the means
element of the definition, have each contributed to the definitional
imprecisions of human trafficking.

147
148
149

Shamir, supra note 18, at 86.
Id.
GALLAGHER, supra note 47, at 49.
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Nevertheless, Shamir and others understand the means
elements to have accrued certain content by experience and
application in international and national contexts. In other
words, the meaning of human trafficking has been determined
by practice and experience—not necessarily through recourse
to the plain language of the U.N. Trafficking Protocol or in
accordance with its drafters’ intentions. Thus, as James Gray
Pope notes, “physical coercion is decidedly not a threshold
requirement for a practice to constitute human trafficking—
other, less robust forms of intimidation have proven sufficient.”150
Hila Shamir specifically observes that “[w]ithholding wages or
identification papers, continually threatening to expose a worker’s
undocumented status to authorities, and using indebted labor
(bonded labor or indentured labor)151 are all understood to satisfy
the means element.”152
Relatedly and quite crucially, human trafficking may also
arise in situations where workers have consented to travel for
work—abduction and deception over the type and conditions of
work are not the sole actions proscribed by human trafficking
law.153 Instead, human trafficking can occur not only when the
type of work one is compelled to engage in differs from what was
promised, but also when the worker has not consented to the
working conditions themselves. Long working hours, illicit or
excessive wage deductions, delayed payment, low wages, and
restrictions on freedom of movement may all support a charge of
human trafficking.154 Deceptive recruitment is not, therefore,
perceived as essential to the violative essence of human
trafficking. Instead, human trafficking emerges as “a combination
of labor rights violations, where each one alone might not amount
to [human] trafficking.”155 Under this configuration, a worker’s
migrant status may contribute to vulnerability, but does it
150
151

Pope, supra note 105.
Debt bondage is

the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal
services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the
value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not
respectively limited and defined.
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 1(a), 266 U.N.T.S. 3, 41 (Sept. 7, 1956).
152 Shamir, supra note 18, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
153 See, e.g., Kathy Richards, The Trafficking of Migrant Workers: What Are
the Links Between Labour Trafficking and Corruption?, 42 INT’L MIGRATION 147, 154
(2004); Shamir, supra note 18, at 87; Gallagher, supra note 32, at 811-12.
154 Shamir, supra note 18, at 87.
155 Id.; ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 13.
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describe the core wrong of human trafficking? Perhaps instead
the wrong is rooted in the employment conditions themselves.
C.

The ILO’s Operational Indicators of Trafficking in
Human Beings

The 2009 “Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human
Beings,” discussed fully in the ILO 2009 Global Report, originated
in a joint ILO and European Commission project to “reach
consensus among European experts on what indicators should be
used to characterize the various elements of the definition of
[human] trafficking for data collection purposes.”156 The project
employed the Delphi method. Developed in the 1950s and widely
adopted throughout the social, medical, and political sciences, this
methodology produces results based on the consensus of a wideranging group of experts.157 In notable contrast to other methods
of data gathering and analysis, the Delphi method operates
through a feedback process conducted in a series of rounds. In
each round, participants fill out questionnaires that the primary
researcher then collects and edits. Prior to the next round, the
researcher returns to each participant “a summation of comments
[to make] each participant aware of the range of opinions and the
reasons underlying those opinions.”158 The returned comments are
offered anonymously. As Chia Chien Hsu and Brian A. Sanford
observe, “in a Delphi study, the results of previous iterations
regarding specific statements and/or items can change or be
modified by individual panel members in later iterations based on
their ability to review and assess the comments and feedback
provided by the other Delphi panelists.”159 The Delphi method
thus offers several unique advantages over conventional means of
assessing group opinion, including the “ability to provide
anonymity to respondents, a controlled feedback process,” and the
minimization of the typical pitfalls of group dynamics, mainly
group pressure to achieve conformity.160

ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
Chia-Chien Hsu & Brian A. Sandford, The Delphi Technique: Making
Sense of Consensus, 12 PRAC. ASSESSMENT OF RES. AND EVALUATION no. 10 (Aug. 2007).
158 Id. at 1, 2.
159 Id.
160 Id. The Delphi method has, however, come under fire for enabling
participant anonymity, which critics contend impedes accountability. For a review of
the literature on the Delphi method, see Sinéad Hanafin, Review of Literature on the
Delphi Technique (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/publications/
Delphi_Technique_A_Literature_Review.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HSL-ZUAT].
156
157
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In the ILO/European Commission human trafficking
project, the surveyed experts hailed from 27 European Union
states and included representatives of the judiciary, the police,
the government, and academic and research institutes, as well
as representatives from NGOs, international organizations,
labor inspectorates, and trade unions. Each expert completed
two successive surveys. The first identified indicators of human
trafficking; the second rated the strength of those indicators.
This report was not only an attempt to standardize
definitions of human trafficking and the meaning of relevant labor
exploitation across Europe, but was also part of a broader effort to
“strengthen[ ] freedom, security and justice in the EU” by
(i) establishing cooperation between Member States and others in the
implementation of the EU strategy to measure crime and criminal
justice; (ii) identifying the policy needs for data on crime and criminal
justice; and iii) identifying the needs for—and/or developing—common
indicators and tools designed to measure crime and criminal justice.161

In fact, the ILO/European Commission project was itself a
subgroup housed within an expert group requested by the
European Council’s Hague Program and convened by the
European Commission to assess the European Union’s need for
data on crime and criminal justice. In this way, the enduring
transnational criminal law paradigm subtly structures what
labor perspectives may most readily graft onto human
trafficking law: a labor perspective focused on migrant labor.
Such a perspective commandeers labor issues and wraps them
in the veil of state security, perceiving migrant labor (abuse) as
a threat to state sovereignty. And yet the operational indicators
describing trafficked work that emerge from the joint report do
not only characterize the kinds of work conditions suffered by
migrant workers in Europe—they also describe large swaths of
the U.S. landscape of low-wage work.162
The Delphi method yielded four sets of operational
indicators: one each for adult labor and sexual exploitation, and
one each for child labor and sexual exploitation. Each set is a
structured list of indicators that together reveal six dimensions of
human trafficking: (1) deceptive recruitment or deception during
recruitment, transfer, and transportation (10 indicators);163 (2)
ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
See infra Section IV.D; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
163 The sole “[s]trong indicator” of deceptive recruitment for adult labor
exploitation is being “[d]eceived about the nature of the job, location or employer.”
“Medium indicators” include “[d]eceived about the conditions of work”; “[d]eceived about
content or legality of work contract”; “[d]eceived about family reunification”; “[d]eceived
161
162
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coercive recruitment or coercion during recruitment, transfer, and
transportation (10 indicators);164 (3) recruitment by abuse of
vulnerability (16 indicators);165 (4) exploitative work conditions (9
indicators);166 (5) coercion at destination (15 indicators);167 and (6)
abuse of vulnerability at destination (7 indicators).168
For each of the six identified dimensions of human
trafficking, a combination of strong, medium, or weak
indicators can indicate a positive assessment, meaning that the
dimension is present for the victim. A positive assessment can
include two strong indicators, one strong indicator and one
medium or weak indicator, three medium indicators, or two
medium indicators and one weak indicator. The final analysis
involves combining all six elements to identify victims of
about housing and living conditions”; “[d]eceived about legal documentation or obtaining
legal migration status”; “[d]eceived about travel and recruitment conditions”; “[d]eceived
about wages/earnings”; and “[d]eceived through promises of marriage or adoption.” The
lone “[w]eak indicator” of deceptive recruitment is being “[d]eceived about access to
educational opportunities.” ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
164 The sole “[s]trong indicator” of coercive recruitment for adult labor exploitation
is “[v]iolence on victims.” “Medium indicators” include “[a]bduction, forced marriage; forced
adoption or selling of victim”; “[c]onfiscation of documents”; “[d]ebt bondage”; “[i]solation,
confinement, or surveillance”; “[t]hreat of denunciation to the authorities”; “[t]hreats of
violence against victim”; “[t]hreats to inform family, community, or public”; “[v]iolence on
family (threats or effective)”; and the “[w]ithholding of money.” Id.
165 There are no strong indicators of recruitment by abuse of vulnerability for
adult labor exploitation. “Medium indicators” include “[a]buse of difficult family situation”;
“[a]buse of illegal status”; “[a]buse of lack of education (language)”; “[a]buse of lack of
information”; “[c]ontrol of exploiters”; “[e]conomic reasons”; “[f]alse information about law,
attitudes of authorities”; “[f]alse information about successful migration”; “[f]amily
situation”; “[p]ersonal situation”; “[p]sychological and emotional dependency”; and
“[r]elationships with authorities/legal status.” “Weak indicators” number the “[a]buse of
cultural/religious beliefs” and “[g]eneral context” among their ranks. Id.
166 For adult labor exploitation, the “[s]trong indicator” of exploitative conditions
of work is “excessive working days or hours.” “Medium indicators” include “[b]ad living
conditions”; “[h]azardous work”; “[l]ow or no salary”; “[n]o respect of labour laws or
contract signed”; “[n]o social protection (contract, social insurance, etc.)”; “[v]ery bad
working conditions”; “[w]age manipulation.” “No access to education” is considered a
“[w]eak indicator.” Id.
167 For adult labor exploitation, “[s]trong indicators” of coercion at the
destination include “[c]onfiscation of documents”; “[d]ebt bondage”; “[i]solation,
confinement, or surveillance”; and “[v]iolence on the victims.” “Medium indicators”
include “[b]eing forced into illicit/criminal activities”; being “[f]orced [to perform] tasks [or
take] clients”; being “[f]orced to act against peers”; being “[f]orced to lie to authorities,
family, etc.”; the “[t]hreat of denunciation to authorities”; the “[t]hreat to impose even
worse working conditions”; “[t]hreats of violence against victim”; being “[u]nder strong
influence”; “[v]iolence on [the] family (threats or effective)”; and the “[w]ithholding of
wages.” “Threats to inform family, community, or public” are considered “[w]eak
indicators.” Id.
168 For adult labor exploitation, “[m]edium indicators” of the abuse of
vulnerability at the destination include “[d]ependency on exploiters”; “[d]ifficulty to live
in an unknown area”; “[e]conomic reasons”; “[f]amily situation”; and “[r]elationship
with authorities/legal status.” “Weak indicators” are “[d]ifficulties in the past” and
“[p]ersonal characteristics.” Id.
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human trafficking. Based on the results, migrants are
classified as successful migrants (no deception, no coercion, no
exploitation), exploited migrants (exploitation without
deception or coercion), victims of exploitation and deception
(without coercion), and victims of trafficking for forced labor
(deception, exploitation, and coercion).
The information gleaned from the ILO/European
Commission report is quite striking. First, work conditions that
alone would not merit a charge of human trafficking can in
combination pass the crime’s threshold requirements. For
example, one could be deceived about the nature of the job and
about wages or earnings (indicators of deceptive recruitment),
subjected to excessive working hours and wage manipulation
(indicators of exploitation), isolated or surveilled, subjected to the
withholding of money and threats of violence (indicators of coercive
recruitment), given false information about the law, or
manipulated due to a difficult family situation or cultural/religious
beliefs (indicators of recruitment by abuse of vulnerability).
Additionally, one could have documents confiscated, be threatened
with worse working conditions, or have wages withheld (indicators
of coercion at destination). This could occur all while having
difficulties in the past, a dependency on the exploiters, and a poor
economic outlook (indicators of abuse of vulnerability at
destination). This scenario would, according to the report, merit a
charge of human trafficking for forced labor. Various other
combinations of labor violations could also produce charges of
human trafficking for lesser labor exploitation.
The 2009 ILO/European Commission report is therefore
significant for two reasons. First, it offers a reputable model for
how experts across a region can develop a working consensus
on the parameters of human trafficking—a model that could
prove useful as the scope of human trafficking law continues to
be debated. Second, the report is valuable for the experts’
specific consensus that the accrual of labor violations can
produce the type of exploitation prohibited by anti-trafficking
instruments. Interestingly, although the report understands
migrant workers to be the paradigmatic face of human
trafficking, the acts and harms that give rise to the charge of
human trafficking need not result from a worker’s migrant
status. In the above example, the abuse the worker suffers—
the conditions of work that merit a charge of trafficked work—
could be inflicted on many low-wage workers. This suggests
that the wrong of human trafficking has less to do with the
legal status of the workers than it does with the conditions of
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the work endured by workers and by the broader assignation of
duties and responsibilities that workers and employers are
thought to owe one another.
D.

State of the Low-Wage Nation—Surveying U.S. Low-Wage
Work Conditions and the New Low-Wage/Vulnerable
Labor Paradigm

In the landmark 2009 report, “Broken Laws, Unprotected
Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Law in America’s
Cities,” a team of expert policy analysts, researchers, and
professors surveyed 4,387 low-wage workers in Chicago, Los
Angeles, and New York City—the three largest cities in the
United States.169 This report departed from the majority of prior
studies in significant ways.170 It targeted a broader range of
workers than those typically surveyed and took pains to include
workers who often fall through the cracks, including
unauthorized immigrant workers and workers paid in cash.171
The report found widespread and systematic violations of
the most basic workplace protections—the sort assumed to have
been long addressed by U.S. labor law. Among the core labor
protections routinely denied to U.S. low-wage workers are the
right to be paid at least the minimum wage, the right to be paid
for overtime hours, the right to take meal breaks, access to
workers’ compensation when injured on the job, and the right to
advocate for better working conditions.172 Wage violations were
exceedingly common. Of those surveyed, 26% had been paid below
minimum wage the week before; 60% of these were underpaid by
more than $1 an hour.173 One-quarter worked more than 40 hours
per week in “off the clock” unpaid labor; 76% were not paid the
legally required overtime rate.174 Workers with violations had put
in an average of 11 hours of underpaid or unpaid overtime.175
Moreover, the survey found that 30% of the tipped workers
surveyed were not paid the tipped worker minimum wage, which
by state law is lower in New York and Illinois than the standard
state minimum wage.176

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 21, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-4.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
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Workers were also subjected to long working hours, at
times without pay.177 One quarter of surveyed workers exceeded
their work shift.178 Of those workers, 70% received no pay for
extra work.179 Regardless of the form of payment (cash or check),
in California, Illinois, and New York, employers are legally
mandated to furnish workers with documentation of their
earnings and deductions.180 Of those surveyed, 57% did not
receive the required documentation, and 41% reported illegal
employer deductions for damage or loss of work-related tools,
materials, or transportation181
Additionally, when low-wage workers attempted to
assert their labor rights, legal processes failed them. One in
five workers surveyed reported either filing a complaint or
attempting to form a union in the last year.182 Of those, 43%
experienced some form of retaliation, including termination or
suspension, threats to cut hours or pay, and threats to call
immigration authorities.183 Another 20% did not make a
complaint even after suffering a serious workplace problem,
such as the failure to be paid a minimum wage, discrimination,
and dangerous working conditions,184 and 50% refrained from
reporting violations due to fear of termination.185 Furthermore,
10% failed to report due to fear of hour and wage cuts, while
36% believed that reporting would not change the harmful
practice or otherwise provide them with redress or relief. 186
This brief account of U.S. low-wage work conditions
evinces the continuities between erstwhile legal low-wage work
and the kind of exploitative work that meets the legal definition of
trafficked work. In this way, the new low-wage /vulnerable labor
paradigm demonstrates how, depending on the context, human
trafficking law may cast a wide enough net to include a
significant portion of workers within the U.S. low-wage labor
market. This is significant because it taps into the crisis inherent
to human trafficking law itself: that of envisioning the act of
human trafficking as befalling certain individuals or
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Id. at. 2-3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
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understanding human trafficking as rooted in collective labor
exploitation that does not discriminate by citizenship status.
Further, comparing conditions of low-wage work with
conditions that meet the legal definition of trafficked work shows
that attempts to rescue or rehabilitate trafficked workers will not
end their exploitation—not when an exploitative low-wage labor
market is the liberation that awaits them. A low-wage/vulnerable
labor paradigm reveals how, from chronic wage theft to increased
vulnerability to on the job sexual violence, otherwise legal lowwage work can look the same as the kind of exploitative work that
meets the legal definition of trafficked work—even if other
elements of a human trafficking charge are not present and
human trafficking itself is not a supportable charge. As such,
understanding human trafficking as having more in common with
low-wage and vulnerable labor abuse than slavery or criminal
gender violence is both normatively and descriptively more useful
than interpreting human trafficking through those current
dominant paradigms, which also tend to view all human
trafficking as rooted in migration problems.
V.

RETHINKING SLAVERY, FORCED LABOR, AND
EXPLOITATION

The conflation of human trafficking with slavery risks
upending distinctions between owning and exploiting human
beings. While such distinctions are never clean or easy to discern,
casting all human trafficking as slavery nevertheless muddies the
waters in ways that might well hinder efforts to eradicate less
severe forms of exploitation proscribed by anti-trafficking
instruments in one of two ways. On the one hand, the charge of
slavery can tilt the focus of anti-trafficking efforts towards the
most extreme, “slave-like” abuses—the kidnapped woman
chained to a bed in a brothel, the migrant worker beaten and
forced to farm acres of arid land. Naming slavery as the core
wrong of human trafficking thus cuts against expert consensus
that the accretion of labor violations—at times in otherwise legal
labor situations—can create exploitative conditions sufficient to
merit a charge of human trafficking.
On the other hand, calling all forms of human
trafficking slavery runs counter to the careful debates within
the international law of slavery that have taken place since the
turn of the millennium. These judgments, which concern the
relationships between slavery, forced labor, and sexual
exploitation, recognize that the legal parameters of slavery are
of enduring consequence. Deliberations about what constitutes
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slavery are ultimately deliberations about what protections the
international order of states are willing to enforce as jus cogen
norms.187 Once again, less extreme exploitation proscribed by
human trafficking law may slip through the cracks.
Yet while the slavery paradigm is less than ideal, the
desire to label all human trafficking as slavery is itself an
impassioned response to the global expansion of capitalism in the
1990s. While a full assessment of slavery law is beyond the focus
of this article, the following sections track flashpoints in the legal
trajectory of enslavement in the twenty-first century. In an age
with little de facto slavery, contemporary international slavery
judgments have reconfigured the meaning of “ownership” by
incorporating acts under the rubric of slavery acts that more
closely resemble force or coercion—the hallmarks of forced
labor.188 This reformulation suggests that the new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm is conceptually consistent with
ongoing debates in slavery law proper. In other words, the new
paradigm’s placement of working conditions—rather than
movement/recruitment or slavery—at the heart of the offense
does not introduce new difficulties in debates about how to
distinguish severe instances of forced labor from slavery. Instead,
by distancing human trafficking from a slavery paradigm, the
new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm preserves the legal
integrity of slavery by expressly locating the wrong of human
trafficking in the exploitation of worker vulnerability through the
imposition of poor labor and employment conditions. In this way,
the new paradigm more clearly differentiates lesser exploitation
from slavery proper.
A.

The Relationship Between Slavery and Human Trafficking

Human trafficking’s definitional problems first necessitate
the establishment of its wrong and then require an analysis of
how the proffered wrong impacts debates within slavery law that
concern the boundaries between slavery and forced labor. Control
and ownership are at the heart of internationally accepted
definitions of slavery.189 Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery
Bassiouni, supra note 24, at 67-68.
See Holly Cullen, Contemporary International Legal Norms on Slavery, in
THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 304, 304-05 (Jean Allain ed., 2012) (arguing
that contemporary slavery is largely de facto slavery and that control that amounts to
ownership—not coercion—should be the criteria by which slavery is determined).
189 The classic understanding of ownership holds that it is not a single, unified
thing, but rather a collection of severable incidents (or powers) that can be divided
between and amongst multiple owners. See A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD
187
188
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Convention establishes the benchmark definition of slavery:
“Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”190
Generally speaking, the wrong of slavery lies in treating
a person as one would treat property and exerting ownership
when no legal right to ownership exists.191 This understanding
of slavery, coupled with the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibitions
against slavery and involuntary servitude,192 established the
initial operational and conceptual parameters of the TVPA.193
How practitioners and policymakers define the wrong of
human trafficking, however, contributes to the question of
what acts constitute slavery. When, for example, the Obama
administration characterized all human trafficking as at its
core a problem of enslavement, it theoretically expanded the
practical meaning of what it means to exercise “any or all of the
powers attaching to ownership.”
Initially, human trafficking was construed through a
criminal gender violence paradigm—one that emphasized sexsector human trafficking. Under this framework, even consensual
commercial sex acts could be deemed “sexual slavery” because the
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (describing 11 incidents
of ownership: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to
income, the right to capital, the right to security, transmissibility, absence of term,
prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and residuary character).
190 1926 Slavery Convention art. 1(1), supra note 8, 60 L.N.T.S at 263; see also
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (defining enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the
course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”).
191 See R. M. Hare, What is Wrong with Slavery?, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 103, 104
(1979) (arguing that even if slavery can be justified through a utilitarian calculus in an
imaginary case, it is still wrong because it almost always causes misery in the actual world).
192 “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
193 Additionally, if the 1926 Slavery Convention rendered the suppression of
slavery a standard of civilization that no state may abrogate, the presence of forced
labor has historically had less bearing on the international assessment of a state’s
civility. As Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, the British Delegate to the League of Nations
and the primary drafter of the 1926 Slavery Convention noted, “I do not think that
there is any nation, civilized or uncivilized, which does not possess powers enabling the
Government, for certain purposes and under certain restrictions, to require forced or
compulsory labor on the part of its citizens.” While the instant examples of mandatory
military service and prison labor come to mind, the 1926 Slavery Convention’s
demarcation between the absolute proscription of slavery and the more flexible
approach to forced labor has resonated far beyond these practices, shaping our
understanding and approach to human exploitation to this day. League of Nations,
Question of Slavery: Report of the Sixth Committee: Resolution, League of Nations
Official Journal, (Special Supplement 33) Records of the Sixth Assembly: Text of
Debates, Nineteenth Plenary Meeting, Sept. 26, 1925, 156-57.
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sexual self, in this view, could neither be owned nor alienated.194
In contrast, the Obama administration explicitly understands
human trafficking as embedded in the historical trajectory of U.S.
slavery as a social institution. Louis CdeBaca, the current U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking
in Persons, explains the trajectory of slavery and human
trafficking as follows:
In the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, there was a perception that
the problem of slavery, of sharecropping, was a thing of the past . . . .
And, quietly, the abusers were bringing in immigrants to replace the
African American community . . . . The involuntary servitude and
slavery program had been a little bit on the back burner during the ‘70s
and ‘80s because of the gains of the Civil Rights Movement . . . . And,
then, by the ‘80s and ‘90s, we were starting to see—whether it was
Guatemalans, or Mexicans or others—suffering often in the same farms
in the American South picking tomatoes, cucumbers, onions.195

The Obama administration’s embrace of the term
“modern slavery” is thus presented as a corrective to the prior
administration’s overwhelming emphasis on sex-sector human
trafficking. Proponents of this line of thinking applaud not only
its renewed attention to non-sex-sector exploitation, but also
the subject of that exploitation: migrant workers. Even those
who are skeptical of the turn towards the explanatory power of
slavery embrace efforts to assuage and address the plight of
migrant workers, albeit through a labor paradigm.196
While a slavery paradigm is not the best or most accurate
approach to establishing the wrong of human trafficking, it would
be a mistake to see “new abolitionism” arising in necessary
opposition to a broader low-wage/vulnerable labor approach. The
impulse to establish slavery—and in particular, the U.S.
historical and legal experience of slavery—as a leitmotif for
human trafficking is a real, if at times inchoate, attempt to
grapple with the new realities of global labor exploitation. The
resurrection of the U.S. experience of slavery through human
trafficking law can be understood as an attempt to push back
against one of the central tensions of slavery law: the tendency to
“equate collective forms of oppression (political repression, racial
discrimination and exclusion, etc.) with an individual relationship
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Phillip Martin, Underground Trade Part Seven: Why Human Trafficking is
Called Modern Day Slavery, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:58 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phillip-martin/underground-trade-part-se_b_2929373.html
[http://perma.cc/Z3GT-H3GS].
196 See, e.g., Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1656-57.
194
195
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between a master and a slave.”197 “Modern slavery” may well be
moving towards recognition of the routinized, systemic face of
modern labor exploitation.
While the sentiment driving the rhetoric of modern
slavery is laudable, it is, this article argues, nevertheless
inadvisable to interpret the range of acts proscribed by human
trafficking law as slavery. For legal scholars, the persistence of
the term “modern slavery” in the context of human trafficking
should urge a revisiting of what acts convey ownership that is
tantamount to slavery.198 That said, the notion of “modern
slavery” should also prompt a reappraisal of other, lesser forms
of labor exploitation proscribed by human trafficking law, lest
they fall through the cracks.
For example, recent Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) cases in which labor-sector human
trafficking was prosecuted as Title VII race and national-origin
discrimination are indicative of this point.199 In four cases, two of
which have been successful, the EEOC has adopted the language
of human trafficking as slavery and used it to construe human
trafficking as Title VII race, national origin, and sex employment
discrimination in a series of class action suits geared towards
197 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Questions of Slavery and the
Slave Trade in All Their Practices and Manifestations, Including the Slavery-Like
Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism: Apartheid as a Collective Form of Slavery 1
(July 2, 1981).
198 In another project currently in progress, I explore this complex of issues.
See Reimagining Ownership: The Impact of Sexual Violence on the Law of Forced Labor
and Slavery, draft project on file with author.
199 These EEOC human trafficking cases, some of which were initially filed
during the Bush administration, have gained traction as a crucial component of the
EEOC’s Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) for 2013-2016. The SEP sets the direction of
the EEOC, establishing EEOC priorities and identifying where it will invest the bulk of
its resources and efforts to combat workplace discrimination, inequality, and injustice,
of which human trafficking is but one component of a range of abuses that trouble lowwage workers. The 2013-2016 SEP in part “target[s] disparate pay, job segregation,
harassment, trafficking and discriminatory policies affecting vulnerable workers,”
demonstrating that large class discrimination suits that include workers who have
been trafficked may be no flash in the pan, but rather a sign of litigation to come. See
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN, FY 2013-16, at 1 (2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm [http://perma.cc/67CY-YAQQ]; see also Chellen v.
John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (involving Title VII race
and national origin discrimination claims for the hiring of East Indian migrant workers
for employment in a joint venture between John Pickle Co. and a Kuwaiti company);
Consent Decree, EEOC v. Trans Bay Steel Corp., No. 2:06-cv-07766 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8,
2008) (involving Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims for 48 Thai
welders on H-2B visas); EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (D.
Haw. 2012) (involving Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims for
hundreds of Thai workers on H2-A visas); David v. Signal International, LLC, No. 081220, 2012 WL 4344540, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2012) (involving Title VII race and
national origin discrimination claims for 500 Indian nationals on HB-2 visas).
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addressing the systemic abuse of vulnerable workers’ civil rights
at U.S. worksites. This emerging case law illustrates some of the
conceptual risks of understanding human trafficking within the
U.S. model of slavery. In these cases, the severe racial and
discriminatory core of slavery as a crime and experience pulls
attention, again, towards migrant workers, who are racialized as
the “new slaves.” This contributes, again, to a hyperfocus on the
most extreme forms of migrant exploitation and fails to capture
the more mundane, yet equally prohibited exploitation that
affects migrant and nonmigrant workers.
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor approach can be
understood as a correction to the excesses of the TIP Office’s
approach—as a necessary recalibration of legal norms in the wake
of the globalization and technological changes of the 1990s. Much
as the concept of labor law itself emerged from the failure of
traditional contracts principles to produce a desirable balance
between individual autonomy and the distribution of wealth in
the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, the new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm may be viewed as another turn
of the wheel.
Recent slavery case law bears out this claim, illuminating
how ambiguities that now inhere within slavery law itself
complicate its meaning and scope in ways that precede, presage,
and implicate the legal discourse on human trafficking. Recent
international judgments have undermined the boundary
between slavery and forced labor.200 Further, as human rights
courts have begun to hear slavery disputes, the framing of the
issue has shifted from the traditional calculus of whether an
individual engaged in the proscribed act of owning or controlling
another person to an approach that evaluates whether the
individual right to be free from slavery has been abrogated due
to failures of the state.201 In other words, while human rights
approaches to slavery still focus on the individual harm, they
have also enhanced the political profile of slavery by holding
states accountable for its occurrence in highly public ways—and
they have done so at a time when the line demarcating slavery
from forced labor has weakened.

See infra Section V.B.
See Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 363 (2005); Rantsev v.
Cyprus and Russia, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 90 (2010); Ituango Massacres v. Columbia,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 141
(July 15, 2005); Montero-Araguren v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, ¶ 28 (July 5, 2006).
200
201
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A new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm will help make
sense of these shifts. What the new low-wage/vulnerable labor
paradigm offers is another angle on the slavery debates—one
where the notion of control or ownership moves beyond individual
bad actors, individual freedoms, and identity-based equality
frames. The sum of anti-trafficking efforts amounts to an
unacknowledged and undertheorized account of human
trafficking’s wrong as rooted in the vagaries of low-wage and
vulnerable labor. Recognizing human trafficking’s wrong as a lowwage/vulnerable labor wrong answers the call from labor law
scholars to broaden the scope of the discipline beyond
employee/employer relationships, the work enterprise, and even
individual states, to global labor markets more generally.202 This
approach shows promise for moving human trafficking debates
beyond the individualistic lens of human rights and discrimination
frameworks that can characterize slavery.
B.

International Law and Judgments: De Facto Slavery
and Its Proximity to Forced Labor

If one were of the opinion that slavery was largely a relic
of the past, a survey of twentieth-century international judgments
on slavery would do little to dispel that notion. The twentieth
century witnessed only one international judgment that touched
on slavery—the 1905 Muscat Dhows case.203 Renewed popular
and legal interest in the subject only converged in the first decade
of the twenty-first century, when “sex slavery” in the former
Yugoslavia and the wave of global labor migrations spurred by
the ascent of global capitalism in the aftermath of the Cold War
led to the passage of the first anti-trafficking instruments in
roughly 60 years.204 Subsequently, a spurt of slavery cases
appeared on the international scene, resulting in judgments by
202 New conceptualizations of labor law integrate its historical mission to
protect and regulate economies with the contemporary realities of global markets and
workplaces. See, e.g., Judy Fudge, Labour as a “Fictive Commodity”: Radically
Reconceptualizing Labour Law, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 120, 128-29 (Guy Davidov
& Brian Langille eds., 2011); Richard Mitchell & Christopher Arup, Labour Law and
Labour Market Regulation, in LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 3
(Christopher Arup et al. eds., 2006).
203 Muscat Dhows (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), XI RIAA 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905).
204 See Siddarth Kara, SEX TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN
SLAVERY (2009); Interviews with Siddharth Kara, COLUM. U. PRESS (Jan. 6, 2009, 10:53
AM), http://www.cupblog.org/?p=488 [http://perma.cc/6G6Q-LTWH] (“Abolitionists must
also not forget that powerful macroeconomic forces unleashed during the process of
economic globalization in the post-Cold War era have been more responsible than any
other force for the unforgivable rise in contemporary slavery.”).
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY),205 the European Court of Human Rights,206 the Economic
Community of West African States Community Court of
Justice,207 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.208
The creation of our contemporary anti-trafficking legal
regime accompanied and abetted this surge in international
legal attention to slavery. Anti-trafficking provisions not only
kept international interest in slavery alive but also allowed the
public to interrogate the meaning and scope of slavery and
other types of exploitation that occur both internationally and
domestically. Jean Allain has called these developments the
“renaissance of the legal definition of slavery.”209
This renaissance, however, has not simply propelled the
issue of slavery to legal prominence. It has also put pressure on
the definitional parameters of the act, blurring distinctions
between slavery and forced labor and forcing the question of
what constitutes de facto slavery in an age where de jure
slavery has been largely abolished.210 The first successful
attempt to prosecute the crime of enslavement under
international law is evocative of these tensions. The case also
illustrates a kind of feedback loop between human trafficking
and the high-profile “sexual slavery” prosecutions of the late
1990s and early 2000s.
The 2002 ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., was
the first contemporary international decision on slavery.211 At
this time, the early dominance of “sex trafficking” as the
primary descriptor of human trafficking aided in ushering
slavery back into the juridical spotlight. Simultaneously, the
205 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
206 See, e.g., Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333; Rantsev, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65.
207 Koraou v. Republic of Niger, App. No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, Judgment, ¶ 72,
The Court of Justice for the Economic Community of West African States (Oct. 27,
2008), https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/case-law-doc/traffickingpersonscrimetype/ner/2008
/h_m__v__republic_of_niger_html/Hadijatou_Mani_v._Republic_of_Niger_Community_
Court_of_Justice_Unofficial_English_translation.pdf [http://perma.cc/NV5D-GTEB].
208 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 195, Special
Court for Sierra Leone (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/
AFRC/Appeal/675/SCSL-04-16-A-675.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QAX-JYDL].
209 Jean Allain, The Legal Definition of Slavery in the Twenty-First Century, in
THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 199, 214-15 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
210 Some cases arising before African regional courts, however, have involved
situations that more closely resemble de jure slavery. See Malawi African Association et al.
v. Mauritania, Comm., Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 a 196/97 and 210/98, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 132-35 (May 11,
2000), http://www.refworld.org/docid/52ea5b794.html [http://perma.cc/XES3-DZSK].
211 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).

622

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

equation of sex-sector human trafficking with slavery was fed
by the new international judgments on slavery.212
In Kunarac, Serbian militia members, pursuant to their
involvement in the infamous “rape camps” of Foca, were charged
with enslavement as a crime against humanity under Article 5(c)
of the ICTY statute.213 Kunarac set the standard for subsequent
tribunal and international legal treatments of slavery in ways
that muddied the boundaries between slavery and forced labor.
With no definition of slavery provided by the ICTY charter, the
Trial Chamber II’s judgment lists acts that might constitute
enslavement. The list of acts, however, contained language
reflecting both ownership (slavery) and coercion (forced labor).214
The Kunarac decision’s list of indications of enslavement included
“elements of control and ownership.”215
This ambiguity is mirrored in the more recent
International Criminal Court (ICC) case regarding sexual slavery,
212 U.N. Special Rapporteur Gay McDougall, for instance, minced no words
regarding the relationship of “sexual slavery” to slavery proper. “The term ‘sexual’
is . . . an adjective to describe a form of slavery, not to denote a separate crime.” Gay
McDougall, Special Rapporteur, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery, and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998).
213 Statute of the International Tribunal art. 5(c), annexed to U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (adopted by S.C. Res.
827, ¶¶ 1-2 (May 25, 1993)).
214

Under this definition, indications of enslavement include elements of control
and ownership; the restriction or control of an individual’s autonomy, freedom
of choice or freedom of movement; and, often, the accruing of some gain to the
perpetrator. The consent or free will of the victim is absent. It is often rendered
impossible or irrelevant by, for example, the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion; the fear of violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of
power; the victim’s position of vulnerability; detention or captivity,
psychological oppression or socio-economic conditions. Further indications of
enslavement include exploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory labor or
service, often without remuneration and often, though not necessarily,
involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking. . . . The
“acquisition” or “disposal” of someone for monetary or other compensation, is
not a requirement for enslavement. Doing so, however, is a prime example of
the exercise of the right of ownership over someone. The duration of the
suspected exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership is another
factor that may be considered when determining whether someone was
enslaved; however, its importance in any given case will depend on the
existence of other indications of enslavement. Detaining or keeping someone in
captivity, without more, would, depending on the circumstances of the case,
usually not constitute enslavement.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment of the Trial
Chamber, ¶ 542 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). For an
illuminating discussion of these issues, see Cullen, supra note 188.
215 Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T ¶ 542.
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Prosecutor v. Katanga.216 In this case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
declared that sexual slavery, consistent with the Rome Statute’s
and U.N. Rapporteur McDougall’s characterizations,217 could be
regarded as a particular form of enslavement, yet the Pre-Trial
Chamber still referenced forced labor and servile status.218
Although the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judgment contained language
concerning rights of ownership, its primary focus was on
deprivation of liberty, sexual and otherwise.219
This brief survey of slavery law demonstrates how the
slipperiness between slavery and forced labor does not occur
solely because of difficulties within human trafficking legal
discourse, but rather also results from shifting perspectives of
the wrong of slavery and who or what should be held
responsible for providing redress.
C.

Differentiating Slavery, Forced Labor, and Other
Exploitation: The New Low-Wage/Vulnerable Labor
Paradigm’s Potential

Viewing the wrong of human trafficking as a lowwage/vulnerable labor wrong may help clarify the relationship
between lesser forms of exploitation and slavery. If there are
qualms about weakening the distinction between forced labor
and slavery, then setting human trafficking’s wrong as a lowwage/vulnerable labor one can help move past the Obama
administration’s current attempts to cast all forced labor
(through the elimination of the movement/recruitment
requirement) as human trafficking and all human trafficking
(including the lesser exploitations that also comprise it) as
slavery. In other words, the new low-wage/vulnerable labor
paradigm can not only more accurately reflect the range of
harms prohibited by human trafficking law, it can also help
keep legal debates about slavery focused on the very real issue
of what separates it from forced labor. Clarifying the wrong of
human trafficking will thus have the benefit of refining the law
of slavery in that important way.
Perhaps most significantly, the new low-wage/vulnerable
labor paradigm has the potential to spur conversation not only
about what it means to be a slave in the twenty-first century, but
216 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges (Sept. 30, 2008).
217 See McDougall, supra note 212, ¶ 30.
218 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07 ¶¶ 430-31.
219 For a more in-depth discussion, see Cullen, supra note 188, at 306-07.
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what it means to be a worker in the twenty-first-century global
economy. Understanding the wrong of human trafficking through
the new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm could compel careful
debate over the desired normative nature of the relationship
between workers and the conditions of their work. Here, the work
relationship is not reducible to an isolated connection between
individual employees (migrant or otherwise) and employers. Nor
is freedom in work understood simply as the ability to enter into
an individual employment contract that one has the “choice” to
embrace or decline. Rather, the new low-wage/vulnerable labor
paradigm is the chance for a global reckoning of what social
protections should be extended to workers based not on their
status as citizens or migrants but rather on their labor-force
membership status—on their identity as workers. Locating the
wrong of human trafficking through the new low-wage/vulnerable
labor paradigm offers both a coherent theory of why all acts
proscribed by human trafficking law are wrong and an analytic
blueprint for addressing the complex harms and root causes of
human trafficking.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the standards adopted by international
agencies and other federal departments, the U.S. TIP Office has
attempted to absorb forced labor beneath the banner of human
trafficking via an abandonment of any movement/recruitment
requirement for a charge of human trafficking and
simultaneously reconceptualize all human trafficking as slavery.
These transformations in the law have occurred as an
international push to incorporate a labor perspective in human
trafficking law has taken root. This emergent labor perspective,
which uses migrant labor as a template, understands that the
accumulation of poor labor conditions, which individually might
simply constitute discrete labor violations, can cross the threshold
into human trafficking.
The naming of human trafficking as modern slavery, while
signaling the gravity of the act, fails to provide a full account of
why all acts proscribed by human trafficking law, at the center
and at the margins, are wrong. Moreover, the emerging labor
migration paradigm, while usefully identifying human trafficking
as a labor issue, analytically limits the would-be structural scope
of a labor analysis of human trafficking by tacitly construing its
wrong as an equality or autonomy wrong suffered by migrant
workers. This labor migration perspective focuses on affording
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migrant workers the same protections as nonmigrant workers in
order to end exploitation.
Yet neither the slavery nor the labor migration approach
describe the full range of exploitative acts prohibited by primary
anti-trafficking instruments. Less severe exploitation, including
the accumulation of poor labor conditions that individually would
not constitute actionable exploitation, are also proscribed—and
largely neglected. This discretionary oversight has left many
migrant and nonmigrant low-wage and vulnerable workers whose
conditions of work might meet the requirements for a charge of
human trafficking outside of legal analysis or attention.
As a corrective, this article argues that the core wrong of
human trafficking is a low-wage/vulnerable labor wrong, where
the conditions of work (which includes commercial sexual acts)
are controlling, independent of the migratory status of the
workers themselves. Theorizing the wrong of human trafficking
in this way, through what this article calls a new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm, captures the full range of
offenses proscribed by human trafficking law, from labor
performed pursuant to enslavement to lesser exploitation. A lowwage/vulnerable labor perspective also allows for a structural
perspective on the wrong of human trafficking, understanding it
as engendered by global labor markets and not individual
wrongdoers alone.
Approaching human trafficking law through the new lowwage/vulnerable labor paradigm not only provides a
comprehensive account of why all acts able to be prosecuted as
human trafficking are wrong, it also helps preserve the legal
integrity of one of the most serious violations recognized by law:
slavery. The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm ensures
that the seriousness of slavery is maintained, while also assuring
that deeply concerning acts of human trafficking are not
overlooked simply because they do not resemble the extreme
conditions of traditional slavery. For these reasons, a theoretical
exploration of the wrong of human trafficking is necessary to halt
the continuously shifting interpretations of its legal definition.
Settling the wrong of human trafficking will help establish a more
cohesive understanding of the problem. Doing so will establish
firm ground to locate and oppose exploitation and the misery that
it brings to workers at home and around the world.

